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This thesis aims to carry out a comparative research to analyse the policies and 
countermeasures taken by various countries related to the trade in Rare Earth Elements 
(REEs). The similarity of the approaches of East Asian countries – China, Korea, and Japan – 
towards the African continent, and South Africa's mineral policies with the goal of national 
development provides the basis for the formulation of a SWOT Matrix analytical tool. As 
mineral resources, particularly REEs, have increased in significance with the advancement of 
modern technology, it will be valuable from an academic, business and political perspective 
to undertake such research in order to consider the optimal policy instruments that can benefit 
resource poor countries, such as Korea in particular, and resource rich countries such as 
South Africa. In Chapter 3, a number of proposals for Korea to establish rational policy 
systems to secure a stable REE supply chain will be put forward, followed in Chapter 4 by a 
SWOT Matrix analysis to provide some recommendations to South Africa for a number of 
policy instruments to meet its requirements of generating inclusive economic growth through 
establishing cooperative models.  
The implications of the diverse counterstrategies against China's restrictive policies on REEs 
are particularly enlightening to illustrate the future value of REEs as well as the direction 
mineral policies have progressed and will tend to develop on the global stage, both to secure 
mineral assets and to achieve sustainable development from a domestic and a global 
perspective. It was clear in the research that, from a domestic point of view, resource poor 
countries hoping to organize their own mineral policies for securing mineral resources and 
national development must implement policies which target the vitalization of domestic 
mining, the enhancement of R&D activities, and the building of a flexible stockpiling system. 
By comparing S (strengths) and W (weaknesses) from South Africa and O (opportunities) and 
T (threats) from the three Asian countries, we observe that a cooperative model requires three 
ingredients – competitiveness, comparison, and choice – operating organically on the basis of 
mutual cooperation between importers and exporters.  
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Due to their increasing importance for green and high-tech industries, the demand for Rare 
Earth Elements (REEs) has greatly intensified in recent years. The heightened pressure for 
control of REEs due to the enlargement of their spheres of industrial application has caused 
problems of scarcity, with many parties vying for control of limited natural resources. The 
implications of this supply and demand constraint have led to greater competition between 
nations to secure REE production and resources on the global stage. 
As the world’s biggest REE producer, China’s production of REEs reached 97% of the 
world’s total in 2010. Nevertheless, China is faced with a number of severe problems related 
to REEs, caused by disorderly development and poor management of their mines. A large 
amount of environmental pollution near China’s mines occurred as a result of a failure by the 
government to properly manage the mines and to curb the severe, destructive rivalry among 
small businesses. 
These recently raised environmental concerns are also very closely connected with a number 
of consecutive regulations from Chinese administration to control export quotas on REEs in 
the global market. A series of assertive measures by the Chinese government enlarging the 
scope of export restrictions caused a substantial burden to the raw materials market. As a 
result, many countries relying on the export of high-tech products were forced to endure a 
period of drastically soaring raw materials prices. For that reason, major REE importing 
nations have become acutely focused on the task of preparing countermeasures to secure 
REEs. They are not only investing huge sums of money on Research and Development (R&D) 
and restructuring their own domestic stockpiling policies with a long-term perspective, but 
also investigating overseas nations in possession of large, untapped mineral resources in 
order to build cooperative relationships. 
It is hoped that this thesis will provide an easily understandable perspective on the 
significance of REEs and the rationale behind a number of countermeasures instituted by 
importer nations against China’s REEs policy, particularly for the purpose of countries whose 
economy demands the consumption of large volumes of mineral resources for their industrial 
or military goals, to buttress themselves against unexpected supply shocks resulting in a 
shortage of mineral resources globally, and to provide some direction on how they can use 
XV 
 
REEs to enable their sustainable economic development.  
In addition, this thesis will explore a cooperative model to ensure that both the consumer and 
the provider nations of mineral resources are mutually benefited in the exchange. This will 
take the form of an investigation of the resource diplomacy of import-dependent countries 
located in Northeast Asia – namely, China, Japan, and Korea – towards the African continent, 
as well as an analysis of the strengths of weaknesses of South Africa's mineral policy. 
The sequential order of the chapters of this thesis will be the following: 
 Definition of REEs ------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1 
 China's Rare-Earth Policy ---------------------------------------- Chapter 2 
 Counterstrategies of Importer Nations -------------------------- Chapter 3 
 South Africa and Cooperative model --------------------------- Chapter 4 
 Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5 
To elaborate on this brief outline, Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the characteristics of 
REEs in order to facilitate an overall understanding and definition. Chapter 2 will make the 
argument that mineral resources could be used as a political and economic weapon in relation 
to China's Rare-Earth policy around resource nationalism (RN). Chapter 3 will explore the 
diverse countermeasures devised by countries heavily depending on China's REEs, to provide 
resource poor nations with practical measures to prepare for emergencies related to a scarcity 
of mineral resources, both from a short and long-term perspective. 
Chapter 4 will explore a cooperative model through the framework of a SWOT analysis, by 
comparing the diplomatic strategies currently being employed by resource import-dependent 
countries such as China, Japan, and Korea in order to extract external elements such as O 
(opportunities) and T (threats), as well as South Africa's S (strengths) and W (weaknesses) in 
its own mineral policy. On the basis of the SWOT analysis, chapter 5 will consider the 
implications for how South Africa could reform on how it could reform its own policy 





DEFINITION OF REES 
1.1. The properties and field of application of REEs 
According to the definition by the U.S Geological Survey (USGS), there are seventeen REEs 
comprising yttrium, scandium, and 15 elements of the lanthanides chemical group – 
lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, 
gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium – in the 
periodic table. REEs are divided into two categories: Light Rare Earth Elements (LREEs) and 
Heavier Rare Earth Elements (HREEs), according to the electron configuration of each rare-
earth element. 





















The term ’Rare Earth’ should not be understood as referring to their scarcity in the earth’s 
crust, but from the difficulty of exploitation. In other words, while some REEs are even more 
plentiful than normal ores such as copper, lead, gold, and platinum, their diffuse structure 
makes them highly problematic to extract. This means that REE elements cannot be obtained 
as easily as common ores, which are extracted through relatively uncomplicated production 
processes (Humphries, M. 2012: 2).  
As REEs have unique chemical, physical, electronic and luminescent properties, they have 
crucial utility in a diversity of high-technology industries; particularly in the spheres of 
commercial, military, and green technologies. Firstly, in commercial industries related to the 
metallurgical, optical and medical sciences, they are used mainly for their advanced 
properties in electricity conduction, electron manipulation, automobile, machinery, petro 
chemistry, glass and ceramic manufacturing, and as a catalyst. Secondly, in military 
technologies they are also adopted as crucial elements to produce a range of high-tech 
strategic arms, including precision-guided missiles, smart bombs, unmanned aerial vehicles, 
and radar. Lastly, in green technology industry, REEs have grown vastly in their areas of 
interest and applicability to meet consumer demand and government environmental initiatives 
(Hoatson, M et al. 2011:20). For example, vehicles with permanent magnets and pure or 
hybrid electric-powered engines are gradually achieving greater consumer interest than 
traditional vehicles operated by fossil fuels, since they are able to reduce their spending on 
petrol; and international governments are encouraging their manufacturing industries to make 
their products as eco-friendly as possible to reduce the problem of global warming. These 
newer manufacturing techniques, and the emergence of clean, energy efficient consumer 





Table 1: Major applications of the REEs in emerging high-technology industries 
REEs and Application Fields 
(1) Catalysts: La, Ce, Nd, Pr, Lu, Y, Sm 
 Automotive catalysts 
 Petroleum refining, fuel catalytic cracking, ethane polymerization 
 Fuel and hybrids, diesel fuel additive 
 Air pollution controls, water filtration, hydrogen storage, flints 
(2) Permanent and ceramic magnets: Nd, Pr, Sm, Dy, Tb, Tm, La, Ce 
 Cars—hybrids-plug-in and electric vehicles, window motors, screen wipers, starter motors, hybrid 
batteries, alternators, brakes 
 Electronics—computer disc drives, data storage, iPods, DVDs, CDs, video recorders, consoles, video 
cameras, mobile phones 
 Speakers, headphones, microphones, ceramic capacitors 
 Wind-, hydro-, and tidal-power turbines 
 Electrical motors, refrigeration, generators, cordless power tools 
 Medical imaging 
 Handheld wireless devices 
(3) Phosphors: Y, Eu, Tb, Gd, Ce, La, Dy, Pr, Sc 
 LCD televisions and monitors, plasma televisions and displays, mobile phone displays 
 Energy efficient fluorescent lights, high-intensity lighting, LEDs, mercury-vapour lamps 
 Phosphors—red (Eu), blue (Eu), and green (Tb) 
(4) Polishing powders: Ce, La, Pr 
 Television and computer screens—plasma, CRT 
 Precision optical lenses and electronic components 
 Silica wafers and chips, catalyst for self-cleaning ovens 
(5) Glass additives: Ce, Er, Gd, Tb, La, Nd, Yb, Pm 
 CRT screens to stabilize glass from cathode ray 
 Glass—optical lenses, glass for digital cameras, tinted glass, UV-resistant glass, high-refractive index 
glass, fiber optics 
(6) Ceramics: Dy, Er, Ce, Pr, Nd, Gd, Ho, La 
 Colors in ceramics and glass —yellow (Ce), green (Pr), and violet (Nd) 
(7) Energy storage: La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Pm 
 Rechargeable NiMH batteries, battery electrodes, nuclear batteries 
(8) Medical equipment: various REEs 
 MRI machines, X-ray imaging 
 Surgical drills and tools, surgical lasers 
 Electron beam tubes, computed tomography, neutron capture 
(9) Other applications: 
 Lasers—Yb, Y, Dy, Tb, Eu, Sm, Nd, Pr, Gd, Ho, Er 
 Superconductors—Gd, Y 
 Nuclear—Ce, Er 
 Fertilizers—various REEs 
 High-technology alloys—Yb, Lu, Er, Tb, Gd, Eu, Sm, Nd, Pr, Ho, Sc 
 Ce = cerium, Dy = dysprosium, Er = erbium, Eu = europium, Gd = gadolinium, Ho = holmium, La = lanthanum, Lu = lutetium,  
 Nd = neodymium, Pm = promethium, Pr = praseodymium, Sc = scandium, Sm = samarium, Tb = terbium, Tm = thulium,  
 Y = yttrium, Yb = ytterbium. 
 Source: Hoatson, M. et al. 2011.p20 
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1.2. Global reserves and production 
According to the data estimates by the USGS in 2013, REEs are not evenly distributed 
internationally, but limited to a small set of countries such as China, U.S, India, and Australia, 
and other countries described in table 2. China still maintains a near-monopoly power in the 
world market as the world's largest REE resource, holding 50% of the world’s reserves, 
followed by the U.S which holds about 13%; whereas the other countries – India (3.1%), 
Australia (1.6%), Brazil (0.032%), and Malaysia (0.32%) – hold conspicuously minor 
quantities of REEs compared with these two major nations. Furthermore, in observing the 
production figures of REEs provided by the USGS in the same year, we see that the 
production ranking of those elements corresponds very closely to the countries’ reserve 
quantities, with the exception of Australia and India.  
The world's largest nation, China, produced 86.4% of the world’s total (rounded), whereas 
the production ratio of the remaining countries totaled 13.6%: 6.4 % from the U.S, 3.6% from 
Australia, 2.5% from India, and 1.1% from the other countries (USGS.2013:129). This figure 
illustrates dramatically the scale of inequality that exists with regard to the reserves and 
production of REEs between countries. This ultimately implies that the future REE minerals 
market could become very unstable due to the drastically fluctuating prices that occur 
because of this situation where a single nation holds a monopoly reserve power. 





United States - 7,000 13,000,000 
Australia 2,200 4,000 1,600,000 
Brazil 250 300 36,000 
China 105,000 95,000 55,000,000 
India 2,800 2,800 3,100,000 
Malaysia 280 350 30,000 
Other countries NA NA 41,000,000 




1.3. Demand and supply 
According to the Lynas Corporation, China – whose economic growth over the past decade 
has been nothing short of remarkable – emerged as the largest consumer nation of REEs, in 
accordance with its own growth and expansion in manufacturing capacity. As seen in graph 1 
China constituted 54% of the entire global consumption of REEs, followed by Japan at 24% 
and Europe at 10% (Lynas.2010:10). 
Graph 1: Estimated world consumption and application in 2010 
(Total: 134,000tons) 
 Source: Lynas Corporation Ltd. 2010. p10 
The increasing consumer appetite for high-tech products has also enlarged the fields of 
application of REEs, resulting in a constraint on their supply. Almost all of the most exciting 
and cutting edge commodities such as smartphones, hybrid cars, and wind turbine generators 
utilize permanent magnets as a crucial component in order to operate. As table 3 illustrates, 
for those strong magnetic substances to be produced the magnet makers require neodymium, 
praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium. Therefore, given the increasing demand, many 
REE experts predict that supply of the four elements will begin to fall behind the quantities 




Table 3: Forecast of demand-supply of REEs in 2014 (metric tons) 
Element Demand Supply Balance 
Balance as % of 
Demand 
Lanthanum 51,050 54,750 3,700 7.25 
Cerium 65,750 81,750 16,000 24.33 
Praseodymium 7,900 10,000 2,100 26.58 
Neodymium 34,900 33,000 -1,900 -5.44 
Samarium 1,390 4,000 2,610 187.77 
Europium 840 850 10 1.19 
Gadolinium 2,300 3,000 700 30.43 
Terbium 590 350 -240 -40.68 
Dysprosium 2,040 1,750 -290 -14.22 
Erbium 940 1,000 60 6.38 
Yttrium 12,100 11,750 -350 -2.89 
Ho-Tm-Yb-Lu 200 1,300 1,100 550 
Total 180,000 203,500 23,500 13.06 
Source: Modified from the' Kara, H. et al. 2010. P39' by author 
1.4. The trend of prices 
Before 2009 the overall price of REEs remained at stable levels without any great 
occurrences disrupting the balance between supply and demand. However, once the Chinese 
government began from September 2009 to strongly regulate its illegal mining industries and 
announced a range of policies related to REE export restrictions, many industrial nations 
experienced an unprecedented soaring of prices in the global market from 2008 to 
2011(Seaman, J. 2010:18; Humphries, M. 2013:5). 
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Graph 2: Selected Rare Earth Oxide prices, 2008-2013 (US $/kg) 
 Source: Humphries, M. 2013. P7 
As we can see from graph 2, between 2008 and 2011 the prices of some REEs – four in 
particular – skyrocketed drastically; from three times even to as much as 10 times the prices 
seen in 2008. Those four elements (neodymium, dysprosium, europium and terbium) prove 
that the forecasted inflationary pricing seen in table 3 was remarkably precise. As we see in 
figure 1, these soaring prices began to stabilize and decrease after 2011 as a result of 
increased production by other countries outside of China; and as a result of a reduction in 
demand due to the global economic recession and improvements in technologies, which 
enabled REEs to be substituted by alternative materials. Nevertheless, there are still a number 
of potential risk factors that threaten the possibility of stable market prices in the long-term 
unless China's aggressive policies are somehow curtailed, increased demand for particular 
elements is offset, and sufficient alternative materials become available for current REE 




Figure 1: Global estimated production of Rare Earth Oxides, 2005-2015F 
Source: Piedra, J.2012. p2 
1.5. Environmental Problem and REEs 
In order to extract REEs from raw materials, a number of crucial manufacturing steps must 
occur, such as the following: 
① Mining: extracting rough ores out of deposits in the earth's crust 
② Milling: crushing and grounding mined ores to be fine powders 
③ Flotation: separating valuable metals from mixed ores by both physical and chemical 
methods 
④ Refining process 
Passing from mining to milling, crude ores will be changed to low concentration REOs (0-10% 
elements), and after passing flotation, the low concentration elements will be refined to a 
higher degree of purity (30-70%). Those processes are quite effective for producing high-
purity REOs. Although manufacturers can obtain high quality REEs through these methods, 
the processes have an unfortunate side effect – environmentally damaging toxic wastes are 
also produced such as fluorides, sulphides, acids and heavy metals containing a lot of 
radioactive substances. 
Although mining companies have impoundment facilities to contain these toxic wastes and 
prevent them from seeping into the neighboring groundwater and soil, there have been 
occasions where the possibility of spillover due to improper maintenance and heavy rainfall 
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has been raised (Schüler, D et al., 2011:42-45). For that reason, China and the other major 
countries involved in producing REEs have strengthened environmental regulations in order 
to safeguard the health of inhabitants living in around mining industrial areas and to conserve 
the natural environment. 
1.6. Implications 
It seems to be an unavoidable fact that the future market value of REEs will only continue to 
grow, particularly in light of the past trends and forecasted data we have already looked at. 
On one hand, they have some very apparent advantages compared with common ores, as the 
other mineral elements cannot provide an adequate and comprehensive substitute for the 
unique properties of REEs, particularly in very niche areas of application. Their usefulness in 
the most progressive and valuable consumer technologies is indispensable. For instance, a 
smartphone – now considered a necessity in modern society – is composed of a broad range 
of cutting-edge materials: a semiconductor, a permanent magnet, and a liquid crystal display 
(LCD) or light emitting diode (LED) display. As we can see in table 1, every one of those 
components utilizes REEs in an indispensable way.  
On the other hand, the disproportionality between global REE reserves and production has 
already resulted in national tensions, and has the potential to be the cause of political and 
economic problems, in a situation where a single nation with abundant natural resources can 
leverage its position to become a monopoly power. For that reason, many resource poor 
countries have expressed concern about this eventuality where a single nation can wield so 
much control, as they have already seen the negative economic impacts of soaring mineral 
prices. To summarize, while the benefits of REEs for the developed world are manifold and 
undeniable, the difficulty of extraction and their global scarcity is the cause of quite serious 
international problems. While they have enabled a wealth of technological advancement, 
resulting in products which have enriched the lives of the public, the last several years have 
seen nations engaging in aggressive acquisition and hoarding strategies, resulting in 
monopoly power and a destabilizing of global mineral prices. The significance of REEs can 
be confirmed in the next chapter by reviewing not only the directions of China's REE policy 




CHINA'S RARE-EARTH POLICY 
2.1. Discovery, development and meaning 
The relationship between China and REEs started in 1927, when China's scientists discovered 
their existence in Bayan Obo. Although China only began actively to produce REEs from 
1957, its minerals industry has grown more noticeably than any other country in the world, to 
the extent that today they have 21 production sites outputting a high quantity of REEs (Pui-
Kwan, T, 2011:1). 
Due to the exceptional growth of the REE industry, China overtook the United States in 
mineral production from the late 1980s. Even though the U.S had dominated the REE market 
for almost three decades by running the Mountain Pass mine in California and fostering an 
R&D industry and developing new fields of application for REEs, the ambitions of the U.S 
were not strong enough to stave off China’s aggressive developments in manufacturing. The 
reason China's REE industry has become the world’s largest manufacturing base is that there 
has been a continuous support from government, as the Chinese government viewed REEs as 
a significant resources since the 1960s, and has consistently invested huge amounts of 
expenditure on improving their methods of REE production (Seaman, J. 2010:14). 
As a result of its aggressive expansion policies, China today produces 97% of REEs as the 
world's largest nation, holding approximately 50% of total world's reserve. Moreover, it 
consumed 54% of the entire global production of REEs in 2010. These facts illustrate vividly 
the scale of influence of China's power in the world's mineral market. If we consider the 
increasing global trend and consumer appetite towards high-tech and green industries, 
China’s position with regards to its ability to wield power over the REE market can only be 
expected to increase over time. The recent minerals acquisition policies of China also 
illustrates how China's power over the REE market has been expanded through its monopoly 
control of REEs as a form of political leverage which it uses to expand its global power. 
2.2. Production and reserves 
Although China’s mineral reserves were discovered fairly early, the scale of their power with 
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regards to production of REEs did not become apparent for some time. While the production 
of China's REEs began since 1957, the total volume of China’s output remained lower than 
the United States until the mid-1980s. However, beginning from the early 1990s, China’s 
production of REEs experienced a sharp ramping up, coinciding with their rapid phase of 
economic development between 1990 and 2000. As seen in figure 2, the production of 
China’s REEs saw a very steep increase till 2008, whereas the Rest of The World’s (ROW) 
production gradually decreased. In fact, China’s percentage of REE production and 
acquisition underwent a drastic increase – from 27% in 1990 to more than 95% in 2010 – a 
68% growth in less than 20 years (Jing, Y.C: 2011:51-52). 
Figure 2: Global rare-earth-oxide production trends (1956-2008) 
Source: Pui-Kwan, T. 2011.p3 
In addition to its current levels of production, many of the best geological surveys and 
estimates maintain that China still holds some of the highest quantity of unexploited REE 
deposits in the world. When reviewing figure 3, we can see a map of China with 21 currently 
known REE deposits scattered throughout its provinces and autonomous regions - Fujian, 
Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Inner Mogolia, Qinghai, Shannxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yunan, 
and Zhejiang.   
We can see that almost every region of China with the exception of some minor local areas 
could eventually become production sites for manufacturing REEs. Of the 21 districts, the 
four marked with red stars indicate the current greatest areas of REE productivity.  
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Figure 3: Rare Earth deposits discovered in China 
  Source: Pencht, M. et al.2011.p18 
The reason why the production of REEs in the four regions is more than that of any other of 
the 17 provincial areas is that 98% of the total mines are clustered densely on the four regions. 
By percentage, Baotou in Inner Mongolia has 80% of the mines, followed by the Shandong 
Territory (10%), seven provinces in the Southern part of China (6%), and Sichuan (2%) 
(Pencht et al., 2011:18). 












Types of REEs 
Grade 
(REOs %) 
Bayan Obo, Inner 








Shandong 4(7.7%) 12.7 Over 13 Bastnasite La,Ce,Pr,Nd with high grade 7-10 
Sichuan 1.5(2.9%) 2.4 Over 5 Bastnasite LREEs with high grade 6-8 
Seven Southern 






Others 1.5(2.9%) 2.2 Over 3.7 - - - 
Total 52 131.7 Over 206 - - - 
Source: Modified from the' Schüler, D. et al. 2011. P8' by author 
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The ranking of mineral deposits among the distributed mines corresponds to the sequence of 
reserves illustrated in table 4. In relation to the sheer volume of deposits, no other single 
region’s quantity of deposits is nearly comparable to Bayan Obo, which can fairly be 
considered the heart of China's REE deposits. Bayan Obo was the first location of REEs 
discovered by scientists in 1927, it accounts for about 83.6% of China's REE reserves and it 
makes up around 50% of the total REE production in China (Morrison, W. M. et al, 2012:8). 
For the purposes of obtaining REEs, four kinds of mineral ores have a significant economic 
value and can be used to extract REEs for use in commercial products: bastnasite, monazite, 
xenotime, and rare earth-bearing clays (ion adsorption). While bastnasite deposits are 
dispersed primarily in two major countries – U.S and China – and monazite deposits are 
scattered broadly in many countries over three continents – SA in Africa, China, India, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia in Asia, Brazil and the United States in the Americas, and 
Australia in Oceania (USGS, 2008:135) – more than 80% of the world's ion adsorption 
deposits have been detected to exist among the seven southern regions of China (Vulcan, 
T.2008). 
The formation of these minerals also differs according to the conditions present in their 
geographical location. The deposits of both bastnasite and monazite were formed as a result 
of magma activity, while those of rare earth-bearing clays (ion adsorption mining) were 
formed through prolonged exposure to underground weathering. As a result of these varied 
processes, deposits holding bastnasite and monazite are much closer to the surface of earth 
than those of ion adsorption mining; and of course the extraction procedures for surface 
mining are much less intensive, more economical and less environmentally damaging than 
those for underground mining (Molycorp, Inc.1994: 33-35). 
As China emerged to become the world's largest REE producing country, accounting for 
around 97.3% of world total in 2011, its stature as an exporter of REEs in the global mineral 
market also rose in importance. Graph 3 depicts the dependencies of various countries on 
China’s REEs, and we can see that Japan was by far the largest volume importer of REEs, 
holding 66% of China's volume of exports in 2011, followed by the U.S (7%), France (6%), 




Graph 3: Importers of China REEs in 2011(% of total) 
Source: Morrison, W. M. et al. 2012.p6 
2.3. Issues associated with China's REE production 
The Chinese government has summarized the rationale behind its seemingly restrictive 
policies into three critical issues: meeting the requirements of increasing domestic demand, 
eradicating the practice of illegal mining and smuggling activities, and preventing further 
environmental destruction. 
Firstly, concurrently with its rapid industrial and economic development, China’s demand for 
REEs increased abruptly; more than that of other country in the world over that period. 
According to statistics obtained in September 2013 by the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
China ranked top in relation to the quantity of merchandise exported in world trade for 2012 
(WTO, 2013). This is a good indicator of the sheer quantity of REEs China requires in order 
to manufacture high-tech products such as magnets, batteries, catalysts, and phosphors. Data 
issued by Lynas supports the estimation that China’s consumption of REEs accounted for 54% 
of total world spending in 2010 (Nieto, A. et al, 2012:76). For this reason, some analysts have 
expressed concern that China could see a premature depletion of its reserves within a few 
decades unless it reins in the scale of its REE production. Moreover, if we consider both 
China's long-term plan to become the global leader in the electric vehicle market (Bradsher, 
K, 2009) as well as data estimates provided by Roskill Information Services that forecast 
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China's REE demand remaining at 70% of the global total by 2020 (Shaw, S et al, 2012), the 
increasing anxiety for stable supply and demand on REEs seems to be founded on plausible 
reasoning. 
Secondly, while China’s REE mining levels were the highest level of any other country in 
2010, one aspect of their production was extremely troubling, both economically and from an 
environmental standpoint: the high levels of smuggling and illegal mining activities. In effect, 
China governmental policy placed such an overwhelming emphasis on the purely quantitative 
growth of their REE industry that they neglected to crackdown on illegal mining linked to the 
acceleration of environmental damage and smuggling, even to the detriment of their overall 
mining profitability. According to recent findings reported by Xinhua Press based on statistics 
obtained during the fifth China Baotou Rare Earth Industry Forum, "illegal mining of REEs 
was more than 40,000 tons in 2012". This illustrates the widespread scale of illegal mining 
activities in China and the laxity of Chinese government policies towards criminal mining 
industries (Xinhua Press, 2013). Additionally, it was revealed that the proportion of 
smuggling activities accounted for 40% (20,000 tons) of the total export volume (50,000 tons) 
in 2009 – a staggeringly high number shows vividly the urgency of Chinese governmental 
intervention to preserve its own domestic mining industry (Shujing, Z. 2013:11). 
Finally, it is critical to mention the issues that have arisen due to the environmental 
deterioration caused by REE production, which are putting a strain on shoulders of the China 
government, mining industries, and residents living near these mining districts. The problem 
arose due to the basic principle that the rapid, aggressive expansion of China’s REE 
production necessitated deregulation, since strong regulation would have deterred growth.  
Strictly speaking, the Chinese government did not begin to undertake the regulation of illegal 
mining activities until the environmental problems came to be viewed as a major nationwide 
health and sustainability problem, and the REE industries grew sufficiently to the level that it 
made them the world’s largest producer. Accordingly, the provinces most representative of 
REE production – the northern region known as Bayan Obo and the southern province known 
for HREE-rich sites – have suffered immensely as a result of the environmental destruction 
caused by the proliferation of illegal mining activities. According to the Metal’s Edge, 
analysis of REEs revealed that they are composed of a large proportion of thorium, 
containing unsafe quantities of radioactive substances that bring about diverse outbreaks of 
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diseases such as respiratory disorders, skin rashes, eruptions and digestive disorders 
occurring to residents living in contaminated areas. If those toxic materials were improperly 
disposed of by the mining industry due to inadequate governmental regulations, they could 
negatively affect both the ecosystem and human health. As an example, thorium is so 
poisonous that if it leaked into a source of water supply or farmland, they could become 
polluted to the extent that residents living in areas neighboring these mining industries could 
suffer serious, deleterious health effects (Metal’s Edge, 2010:2-4). 
Given that 2,000 tons of mine effluents are produced as by-products for extracting only 1 ton 
of REEs, we cannot overly emphasize the significance of managing the entire manufacturing 
process around the mining of REEs; not only to protect the lives and health of the general 
public, but to preserve the fragile ecosystem. Though the Chinese government’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) initiated a policy for environmental regulation of REEs-
oriented businesses in order to enforce the improvement of their facilities for the tackling of 
atmospheric pollutants, it remains to be seen whether the outcome will match the intentions 
of the policies. This is due to economic circumstances of small mining industries dependent 
on REEs being highly competitive, leaving little margin for implementing stringent controls 
and environmental regulatory compliance. Therefore, the additional cost needed to meet the 
requirements of the MEP could be so detrimental to the financial condition of small 
businesses that it becomes unenforceable. The regulatory program initiated by the MEP will 
face some particular criticisms around the aspect of its feasibility, since the guideline did not 
contain any incentive and financial support to assist companies with the funding needed to 
improve their facilities to tackle the environmental problems (Metal’s Edge. 2010). 
2.4. The directions of China's REE policy 
In order for those three issues to be resolved, the Chinese government has implemented the 
following four categories of policies (Morrison, W. M. et al., 2012:11-20): 
 Domestic consolidation policy: consolidating small businesses into state-owned 
companies by both merging and shutting down. 
 Export restriction policy: restricting exportation volumes by abolishing export tax 




 Technology-centered strategy: suspending export licenses and limiting foreign 
companies to operate diverse mining activities such as smelting and separation. 
 Exploration overseas mineral resources: aggressively acquiring overseas mineral 
resources to obtain more REEs beyond its own border. 
Deng Xiaoping’s prescient statement in 1992 that "China's rare earth resources can be likened 
in importance to Middle East's oil" provides an excellent springboard to examine briefly the 
way in which the Chinese government has pursued four specific directions of mineral policies 
by means of which it hoped to leverage its copious REE resources to become a developed 
country. And indisputably, their success in a purely economic regard is an admirable lesson to 
other nations in a similarly underdeveloped position. With the benefit of hindsight, we can 
evaluate these four strategies as standards to gauge the extent to which China was successful 
in achieving its ambitious goals. 
2.4.1. Domestic consolidation policy 
By setting a policy of domestic REE consolidation, China’s central government aimed to 
unify and control the entire administration of the minerals industry concerning the matter of 
production, sales, and management of REEs. In order to regulate the industry of small mining 
businesses engaged in illegal operation and smuggling properly, the Ministry of Land and 
Resources announced a plan as a guideline in 2008. The basic goal of the guideline – the 
Plans for Development of National Mineral Resources 2008-2015 – is to build a consolidated 
national system in three of the major REE production provinces within two systems as 
described in table 5.  
Table 5: Contents of plans for development of national mineral resources (2008-2015) 
Three Provinces Components 
Two Systems 
Based on Kinds of REEs 
Consolidation 
into X 






Mainly Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, 
Hunan, and Guangxi 
HREEs 




This table illustrates that the motive behind the consolidation policy for the Chinese 
government is to strengthen its control over the domestic REE industry so that the all centers 
of consolidation are state-owned firms. Once the unification plan has been completed 
according to plan by 2015, the Chinese government would have built up a resilient system by 
which to control its domestic mineral industries. As an example, the Inner Mongolia local 
government in the Northern Province publicized a directive plan according to the guidelines 
in May 2011. As a result of the plan, 31 private companies have been shut down and others 
have been gradually merged into a single entity, the Baotou Rare Steel Rare Earth High-Tech 
Co.  
Due to complexities arising from the fragmented domestic markets, and resistance from 
existing stakeholders with vested rights, the progress of the restructuring efforts of the mining 
industries in southern areas has been much slower and more tenuous than that of the southern 
regions. Nevertheless, China’s administration anticipates that the consolidation of the 
southern provinces will be fully accomplished within a few years into three state-owned 
conglomerates: China Minmetal Corp, Aluminum Corporation of China, and Ganzhou Rare 
Earth Minerals Industry Co. Ltd. Furthermore, apart from the efforts to consolidate the 
fragmented mining industry, China has pursued another ambitious project to build massive 
stockpiling facilities consisting of 10 storage areas to accommodate 100,000 REO metric tons 
– equal to the total amount of global annual production as seen in table 2. If we consider that 
ostensibly the basic function of stockpiling is to prepare for emergency situations, the sheer 
scale of China’s stockpiling could elicit unnecessary misunderstandings from its trading 
partners who might fear that China could make use of those facilities as a means to 
manipulate the global mineral markets for its own economic benefits rather than utilizing 
them for their original purpose. Supposing that China's two projects - the consolidation of 
domestic REE industries and the completion of stockpiling facilities - would be accomplished 
without major opposition in the near future, China's current power over the REE market 
could end up being even more dominant than at the present time. 
Once the consolidation policy was put in place according to the policies designed by 
government officials, China would not only have solved the three problems but also would 
have been able to wield an influential power that controlled demand, supply, and price of 
REEs in the global market. 
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2.4.2. Export restriction policy 
There can be no question that over short periods of time the most efficient way to protect 
precious mineral resources is to regulate them by quantitative volume, to ensure that they are 
not discharged without permission. Although such methods can be very effective, they can 
result in sharply increased pricing of raw materials, which for countries seeking to procure 
them for their own domestic manufacturing is highly onerous and can be perceived as 
anticompetitive. For that reason, the export restrictions instituted by China's policies resulted 
in a widespread resistance from countries dependent on those resources. Nevertheless, 
China's export restrictions policy on REEs has been stringently enforced by the use of two 
methods: a quota system and a tax policy.  
Concerning the quota system, table 6 shows the development of China's REE export quotas 
from 2005 to 2012. We can see that quotas gradually decreased by more than 50% according 
to the guidelines allocated by the Chinese government. 
Table 6: China's export quotas on REEs (2005-2011) 
(Metric tons) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Domestic 48,010 45,000 43,574 34,156 31,310 22,513 22,712 
Joint Venture 17,570 16,070 16,069 15,834 16,845 7,746 7,472 
Total 65,580 61,070 59,643 49,990 48,155 30,259 30,184 
Source: Modified from the' Morrison, W. M. et al. 2012. p17' by author 
As China's domestic consumption of REEs drastically increased by more than three times 
between 2000 (19,000t) and 2009 (73,000t), the reason behind China's implementation of 
export quotas since 2005 appears to stem more from a desire to fortify its own manufacturing 
industry, rather than to protect its ecosystem or to take action against the illegal mining 
companies (Jing, Y.C: 2011:53). Moreover, China’s reduction of mineral allocation between 
its domestic and joint ventures was fairly stable until 2009, but from 2010 the proportions of 
resources shifted drastically towards domestic interests. From the point of view of 
competitiveness, the disparity in resource allocations by the Chinese government could be 
interpreted as an artificial manipulation with a goal of making its domestic businesses more 
price competitive than foreign companies. Due to the reduction of demand as a result of the 
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global economic downturn in the late 2000s and the development of substitutes for China’s 
products in consumer countries, the levels of the export quota ratio remained stable between 
2010 and 2011. However, that should not be taken as an indication that the fundamental 
direction of China's policy has changed on the policy of export quotas because the Chinese 
government has reinforced the policy in specific and strict detail to adapt to the changing 
circumstances in both the domestic and global mineral market (Morrison, W. M. et al., 
2012:17-18). 
Another important means utilized by China to control the export of REEs is taxation policies. 
In the early 1990s, Chinese companies were encouraged to produce and sell REEs to overseas 
markets, receiving some rebates as incentives from the government on export taxes they had 
paid. However, as domestic demand has increased and profits started to dwindle gradually 
from 2000, the promotion plan was abolished in 2005. Instead, the Chinese government 
adopted even stricter taxation by imposing export duties on REE exporters from 2007 to 
control the amount of REEs exported and to subsidize its domestic industries, which were 
able to take advantage of internationally cheap resources. The export duties were imposed 
initially on fewer than 10% of items, and have been increasing until they peaked at 25% with 
a particular emphasis on products making use of REEs (Morrison, W. M. et al., 2012:15-16). 
2.4.3. Technology-centered strategy 
A significant implication of China's REE policy is that China has been able to leverage its 
supply of REEs as a means to attract foreign companies with advanced technology for 
manufacturing downstream products. This tactic is strongly reminiscent of former President 
Jiang Zemin's imperative in 1999 that China should "improve the development and 
applications of rare earth, and change its resource advantage into economic superiority". This 
clearly implies that the ultimate goal of the Chinese government is to leverage their enormous 
capital resources to develop a high-tech industry that could dominate the global market, and 
raise the economic stature of China to that of a fully developed nation.  
China's ambition to become elevated to the status of a developed nation was specifically 
delineated in a proposal, the National Medium-and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020), released by China’s State Council in 2006. The 
central thrust of the plan is to develop China's economic status to be a major innovation 
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center by 2020 and a global innovation leader by 2050 (Morrison, W. M. et al, 2012:19). In 
order to achieve this stated goal, the Chinese government would have attempted to draw 
many leading foreign companies in high-tech products related to automobile and electronics 
to incentivize them to transfer their proprietary technology and manufacturing to China. This 
through strategies such as "Regulations of Foreign Investments in the Rare Earth Sector", 
issued by the National Development and Reform Commission in 2002, and "Export 
Licenses", implemented by the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) from 2006.  
Embedded in those strategies is an element of strong-arming towards foreign companies 
involved in diverse mining activities such as trading, extraction, purification, smelting, and 
separation. This is due to policies which state that these activities cannot be permitted without 
joint participation by Chinese partners, and even forces them to invest financially into China's 
downstream application sectors and REE derived products. (Morrison, W. M. et al., 2012:1, 
18-19) From a practical standpoint, foreign enterprises, being somewhat hamstrung by 
China’s stockpiling and enforcing of price disparities, and highly dependent on REEs in order 
to manufacture high-tech products at competitive price levels, are compelled to migrate their 
manufacturing and research facilities to China. A number of international voices have 
expressed a growing concern about the direction of China’s strategies – particularly from 
nations such as Japan, who have a deep economic engagement in high tech industries, and a 
concomitant dependency on REEs. Many reports emerging in the news evidence a strategic 
concern over China's purpose to become a technologically advanced country by wielding an 
inordinate influence over REEs; as follows: 
Showa Denko KK, a major rare earth alloy producer in Japan, announced recently it 
would increase output of its Chinese joint venture by 50 percent to 3,000 tons a year. 
Hitachi Metals Ltd. is also considering moving part of its Neodymium magnet 
production operations to China (Yan Pei, 2011). 
China is eyeing the valuable know-how foreign companies will bring into joint 
ventures with Chinese firms to gain access to rare earths," said a Japanese trading 
company official, who asked not to be identified. "Obviously, Japan's technology to 
produce high-end magnets is a target (Inoue, 2011). 
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2.4.4. Exploration of overseas mineral resources 
Apart from the regulatory policies enacted by the Chinese government, another significant 
matter relates to China’s ambition to accumulate overseas mineral assets. China's increasing 
rapacity for REEs does not seem to be limited within its own borders, which already hold an 
abundance of raw materials – as evidenced by the fact that China has spent considerable 
resources in the acquisition of mining rights to set up operation in countries in which REE 
industries have been initiated to some degree. As we examine in detail China’s strategies in 
relation to overseas mineral policies, it becomes evident that their actions are driven by a 
single overwhelming motive: the desire to become the largest REE holding nation on earth; 
even to the extent of becoming a de facto monopoly power over the global mineral markets, 
both by intensifying their own domestic mineral resources efforts as well as gradually 
acquiring the mineral commodities of foreign countries.  
Two cases in particular highlight the extent of China’s ambition to become the largest global 
holder of REEs. The first case happened in the U.S in 2005 when the state-owned China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) expressed an intention to take over Unocal, an 
American oil company which accounted for only 0.23% of global output. From an objective 
point of view, this initiative of the Chinese government seems meaningless because at that 
time China was intensifying its investment in oil energy towards the African continent rather 
than North America in which China spent just 2% of its total oil-related budget (Kim, D.H, 
2011:109). Nonetheless, the attempted acquisition was frustrated due to strong opposition 
from U.S political leaders who expressed concerns over the transfer of US oil reserves to a 
company under the remit of China’s government. It later became apparent that Unocal was 
the owner of Molycorp, a mining operator in the REE industry based in Mountain Pass in 
California. As a result of the government’s resistance, Chevron Corporation purchased 
Unocal instead of CNOOC (Seaman, J. 2010:23). 
A similar case occurred in Australia in May 2009 when China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Co 
attempted to purchase a 51.6% share of Australia's Lynas Corporation, the owner of Mount 
Weld Mine, estimated as the world's largest single-deposit REE mine. The attempted 
takeover of the Chinese company was ultimately abandoned due to a new regulation 
introduced by the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board’s that lowered the limit of 
foreigners ownership with respect to major iron ore mine to less than 50%, due to concerns 
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about China's excessive investment in Australia's mining sector (Morrison, W. M. et 
al.,2012:22). 
2.5. Review of the connection between China's policy and resource 
nationalism 
2.5.1. Meaning of resource nationalism 
Even though there is no clear definition of RN, in a broad sense it refers to a tendency of 
governments to attempt to both control the price and export or place production restrictions of 
resources, and to deliberately restrain the abilities of foreign companies to conduct normal 
business practices in order to maximize national profits. This nationalistic tendency manifests 
in a range of governmental interventions around any process related to natural resources: 
possession, production, stockpiling, development, exploration, trading, and price control.  
According to the preface of the Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources General 
Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII), adopted by the UN on 14 December 1962, “The resolution 
had resulted from the General Assembly’s focus on, firstly, the promotion and financing of 
economic development in under-developed countries and, secondly, in connection with the 
right of peoples to self-determination in the draft international covenants on human rights 
(UN, 1962).” According to this statement, the fundamental goal of RN is to safeguard the 
economic rights of countries to reserve a large proportion of their natural resources in order to 
empower them to achieve a self-sustained growth through economic development based on 
capital accumulated from their own resources. This is in contrast to the current situation 
where resources could be being manipulated not as an economic but as a political means to 
enhance a country's influence globally as seen in a case of a territorial dispute between China 
with Japan. Practically, the potential for the misuse of the principle of RN has materialized in 
a recent incident detailed below, which has caused great concern to neighboring or related 
nations. Thus, in a real sense the meaning of RN can be defined as a means by which 
resource-rich countries can exert their influence on the global stage by using their own 
abundant resources as a weapon for political rights and economic prosperity. 
One example, elaborated below, demonstrates how the meaning of RN can be extended 
beyond economic fields into the political sphere, in a case where the Chinese government 
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wielded their control of REEs as political leverage against Japan to deal with a territorial 
dispute over the Senkaku Islands.  
2.5.2. Exerting of China's monopoly power through REEs 
On 7 September 2010, a territorial dispute occurred as a result of a collision between a 
Japanese patrol ship and a Chinese fishing trawler over the Senkaku Islands in the East China. 
Japan’s economic dependency on Chinese REEs for making high-tech products such as 
hybrid cars, wind turbines and guided missiles (Bradsher, K, 2010) was used as a negotiating 
tactic by the Chinese government. The economic imperative for REEs was so overwhelming 
that the Japanese government had no choice but to rescind its insistence upon the detention of 
a Chinese fishing trawler captain responsible for the incident. Although the dispute was 
resolved in a short time, the tactics of the Chinese government caused consternation amongst 
many countries involved with REEs, with a realization that natural mineral resources could 
also clearly be used as political ammunition. The implications of this incident were a catalyst 
to a number of countries, who have responded in a number of ways to prepare to mitigate the 
risks posed by the threat of RN by China. 
If we interpret China’s REE policy based on the concept of RN, taking into accounts is 
political and economic motivations, it becomes evident that the directions of China’s REE 
policies are intrinsically connected to RN, as the Chinese government has sought to achieve 
economic prosperity through these policies – domestic consolidation, export restriction and 
technology-centered strategies – in addition to its political victory over Japan in an 
international territorial dispute. 
2.6. Implications 
The implications of our analysis of the actions of the Chinese government in relation to REEs 
are crucial to enable us to understand both its views towards RN and future core technologies.  
Although the real motives of China’s REE policies must remain concealed to itself, its 
assertive measures and the territorial dispute with Japan are sufficient indicators that RN is a 
significant factor, and have been responsible for the emergence of a number of 
countermeasures by importer nations to restrict the encroachment of China’s monopolization 
of REEs; particularly for nations concerned about the possibility of an REE shortage due to 
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stockpiling as a result of RN in the near future.  
China has raised three arguments as justification for its actions in relation to REEs: meeting 
the need of increasing domestic demand, the eradication of illegal mining and smuggling 
activities, and the prevention of environmental destruction. The Chinese government has 
strengthened its regulatory power over its domestic mineral sector through a number of 
consolidation and regulation measures, as well as undertaken attempts to enlarge the 
ownership of REEs beyond its domestic territories, building gigantic stockpiling bases to 
accommodate nearly 100,000 REO metric tons – equal to their total annual global production. 
This exorbitant level of stockpiling has raised concerns from a number of countries that 
China’s motives are not so much to safeguard their resources as to accumulate a monopoly 
power over REEs. Until now, we have not witnessed China taking large scale, aggressive 
actions which could be pointed to as clear evidence of a misuse of monopoly power, but 
instead have restricted their activities to trivial policies such as technology-centered strategies 
or occasional incidents like their dispute with Japan. However, there is a widespread 
expectation that once the national control system is completed and the depots are filled with 
REEs to a satisfactory level for the Chinese government, the influence of China over REEs 
will become more dominant than the current situation. 
If we move away from the nationalistic perspective, it is crucial to see the importance of 
REEs as a driver of technology-related cutting edge advancement, and a growth engine to 
support sustainable economic development – a fact clearly recognized by China, as evidenced 
by its commitment to the National Medium-and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020). From a long-term perspective, the imperative to 
enable drivers of continuous growth is a key political occupation. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
to review the extent of the potential for REEs to have tremendous synergistic effects on all 
aspects of industrialization.  
   Even though China's aggressive territorial and acquisitive actions in relation to REEs are 
somewhat alarming, they also hint at the scale of the implicit value of REEs from the 
perspective of the Chinese administration. As a matter of course, nations with vested interests 
in the REE industry are more occupied with the concerns over China’s actions than the value 
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of REEs – as witnessed by their hasty reactions to China’s policies, which will be developed 
in Chapter 3.  
   The next chapter will examine the various responses towards China’s policies that emerged as 
countermeasures from developed countries with a deep level of involvement in REEs. This 
review will also illuminate some possible desirable directions for policies to assist fledgling 
nations that have not yet adequately prepared themselves to face shocks related to the 
shortage of mineral assets, to sustain unexpected situations in the global market to safeguard 









COUNTERSTRATEGIES OF IMPORTER NATIONS 
The territorial dispute between China and Japan raised concerns amongst a number of 
relevant nations involved with REEs such as Japan, U.S, EU, and Korea, who responded in a 
variety of ways. Those responses can be categorized, regardless of whether a country was in 
possession of natural mineral resources, into two broad approaches: attempting to avoid 
overreliance on China’s REEs through diversifying supplies, stockpiling, recycling and R&D; 
and cooperative confrontations to secure a stable REE supply chain, through bringing a WTO 
case against China.  
3.1. Japan 
As the nation which directly endured a defeat in a territorial dispute with China, Japan's 
concerns perhaps exceeds any other manufacturing country to meet the demands of its high-
tech industries linked to electronics and automobiles. As an advanced industrial nation, 
Japan's preparation to procure stable materials would have begun at the inception of its 
industrial development, as it would have recognized from a very early stage that its domestic 
resources could not meet the growing demands of high-tech industries such as electronics and 
automobiles. A document entitled the ‘Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supplies of Rare Metal’ 
published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2009, outlined Japan's 




Table 7: Japan's major 4 strategies on raw material and stockpiling 
Strategies Crucial points 
Securing overseas 
resources 
 Resources Diplomacy 
- Building strategic cooperation with nations possessing mineral resources 
through making use of its capital strengths such as technological transfer, 
environmental conservation, and so on.  
- Linking Official Development Assistance (ODA) and resource securing 
strategy.  
 Developing Resources 
- Enhancing its exploration of mineral resources and securing mining rights. 
- Offering financial support and loans for development costs through agencies 
such as Japan Oil, Gas and Metal National Corporation (JOGMEC), the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Nippon Export 
and Investment Insurance (NEXI). 
- Developing its exploitation of deep sea mineral resources. 
Recycling 
- Establishing a recycling system of scrap from products (cell phones and 
digital cameras) containing high concentrations of REEs. 
Development of 
alternative materials 
- Promoting R&D of alternative materials. 
- Establishing strategic partnerships with industry, university, and government 
for fostering research activities of developing alternative materials. 
Stockpiling 
- Continuous evaluation of ore types for stockpiling to cope with the market’s 
supply and demand in a flexible way. 
Source: Modified from the 'Kim, Philsu.2009.p11' by author 
3.1.1. Efforts to secure overseas resources for supply chain diversification 
In order to extricate itself from an excessive reliance on China's REEs, Japan has attempted 
to secure overseas resources for supply chain diversification through both governmental 
diplomatic activities and business activities by invested companies. Significantly, the choices 
of target countries have not been restricted to any particular region, but rather a wide scope of 
global areas – from Central Asia, Africa, and South America – essentially wherever REEs can 
be found in abundance.  
Japan's bargaining cards for facilitating resource diplomacy to secure overseas resources are 
varied and include technology transfer, environmental conservation, and infrastructure 
development, as means of persuading resource-rich countries to enter into contracts for 
mining development projects. In order for those bargaining mechanisms to be used effectively, 
the Japanese government has made extensive use of ODA and JOGMEC.  
Furthermore, through leveraging the formidable negotiating power of JOGMEC, it has 
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consistently pursued cooperative relationships with resource-rich countries through 
transferring technology and also participating in affairs connected with environmental 
conservation (WFF, 2011:59). The achievement of those efforts can be confirmed in a number 
of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) signed with several countries located on different 
continents: Kazakhstan (2009), Mongolian government and Bolivia (2010), Uzbekistan 
(2011), and Mozambique (2012).  
Along with the resource diplomacy endeavors of the Japanese government, the 
aggressiveness of companies as market actors has matched the government’s own 
negotiations. A series of agreements by Japanese companies clearly demonstrate the ways in 
which cooperative and harmonious activities between government and industry can overcome 
the limitation of a lack of natural resources. The outcome of these cooperative undertakings 
would also not have materialized without the well-organized Japanese financial system 
composed of JBIC, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and NEXI. Japan's integrated 
system which links government, industry, and the financial system organically could serve as 
a model for nations lacking in mineral resources to enable them to create synergies with the 
mechanisms available to them in order to secure overseas resources (Hurst, 2011:2). 
 Toyota Tsusho and Sojitz Corporations established a joint venture with Coal and 
Mineral Industrial Group (2008, Vietnam) 
 Sojitz Corporation signed a contract with Lynas Corporation (2010, Canada) 
 Mitsubishi signed a contract with Molycorp to import 750tons of REEs (2011, USA) 
3.1.2. Recycling 
Another measure adopted aggressively by Japan in order to compensate for its lack of mineral 
resources is recycling.  ‘Urban mining', a neologism coined by the government, 
demonstrates the extent of the national fervor for recycling. This ambition to promote 
recycling is manifested in two laws, the 'Home appliance recycling law (2001)' and the 'End-
of-life vehicle recycling law (2002)', which attempt to enforce and enshrine recycling into 
Japanese daily culture. In fact, this approach is very logical considering that the amount of 
REEs extracted from Japan’s recycled products is of such an extent that the term ‘urban 
mining’ is no exaggeration. A press release entitled 'Japan’s “Urban Mines” are Comparable 
to the World’s Leading Resource Nations’ released by the National Institute for Materials 
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Science (NIMS) exposed the impressive scale of Japan’s recycling. 
Japan’s urban mines of many metals exceed 10% of world reserves, including gold, 
(approx. 6,800 tons, or about 16% of the world’s current reserves of 42,000 tons), 
silver (60,000 tons, or 22%), indium (61%), tin (11%), and tantalum (10%)(NIMS, 
2008). 
Nonetheless, the recycling industry faces a challenge surrounding the procedural and 
structural complexity of extraction, as it is impossible to formulate a unified method to 
extract REEs from recycled products composed of varying shapes, structures and materials. 
Therefore, this would indicate that the financial burden of recycling can be onerous to both 
the recycling industry and manufacturing companies who purchase the extracted materials. 
3.1.3. Development of alternative materials 
Japan's efforts for developing alternative materials for REEs have progressed as significantly 
as its initiatives for recycling. A report by METI, 'The Situation Regarding REEs', outlines 
the targets of Japan’s plans to develop substitute materials for REE’s (METI: 2011):  
 Indium for transparent conducting electrodes, 50% reduction 
 Dysprosium for REE magnets, 30% reduction 
 Tungsten for cemented carbide tools, 30% reduction 
 Platinum Group Metals(PGMs) for emission control catalysts, 50% reduction 
 Cerium for precise polishing, 30% reduction 
 Terbium and Europium for fluorescent lamps, 80% reduction 
We can see that the focus of their research activities is not on developing new materials to 
completely displace REEs, but on promoting reductive technologies to reduce the quantities 
of REEs used in manufacturing processes. The reason behind Japan’s focus on the 
development of reduction technology rather than new materials is the dependency within 
their current industrial infrastructure upon escalating quantities of Dysprosium, which is used 
for making permanent magnets for the electronics and automobile industry; as well as the 
scarcity of elements such as Dysprosium and Terbium due to the imbalance between supply 
and demand, as shown in table 3. 
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Those research activities have been being carried out through a series of integrated 
mechanisms linking government, industry, and university in an organic way. For example, the 
project to reduce Dysprosium involves a wide range of participants from highly disparate 
business and civil arenas; including the Tohoku University, Yamagata University, NIMS, 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Santoku Corp., Intermetallics Co., Ltd., TDK Corp., Toyota 
Motor Corp (METI: 2011).  
It is suggested that this impressive level of cohesiveness may have originated from the 
expertise cultivated while conducting a series of 16 research projects in the area of elemental 
strategies launched since 2007 by METI and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology-Japan as joint projects. 
As illustrated in the Appendix, this comprehensive mechanism in which universities 
cooperate with enterprises to develop fundamental fields of research in areas viewed as 
crucial for industry can be highly efficient, as the results of the academic research can be 
linked directly to the applications of commodities. Practical outcomes for reducing the 
amount of REEs have emerged from those research centers in the following ways:   
 NEDO's development of 40% reduction of dysprosium consumption in neodymium 
permanent magnet in 2010(Japan Metal Bulletin, 2010). 
 Toyota's development of a new type of electric motor to cut its dependence on REEs 
in 2011(TODAY'S ZAMAN, 2011). 
3.1.4. Stockpiling 
The aim of Japan's stockpiling focuses on overcoming economic vulnerability in the event of 
an emergency, and in accordance with the demands of global industry that requires a 
continuous supply of REEs to meet the requirements of advancing high-tech products. In 
order to ensure a stable supply of mineral resources and smooth management of Japan's 
economy, the task of stockpiling is being performed by JOGMEC, established in 2004 
(JOGMEC, 2013).  
The scope of JOGMEC's activities to regulate and stabilize the supply of mineral resources 
are comprehensive; even encompassing Japan’s four major strategies for raw material and 
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stockpiling (US DoE, 2010:63): 
 Providing partial funding for overseas field surveys through the Joint Basic 
Exploration Scheme.  
 Funding and engaging in scientific research on new types of exploration, mining and 
recycling. 
 Providing loan guarantees and other financial assistance to high-risk mine 
development projects. 
 Maintaining stockpiles of seven metals—nickel, chromium, manganese, cobalt, 
tungsten, molybdenum and vanadium—while closely monitoring the availability of 
Indium, REEs, platinum, gallium, niobium, tantalum and strontium.  
 Gathering and disseminating information on mineral availability and policies in 
various nations.  
Cumulatively, these three strategies – securing overseas resources, recycling, and 
development of alternative materials – form a cohesive stockpiling mechanism which 
thoroughly bridges private and public sectors. Specifically, the structure of Japan's REE 
stockpiling is clearly delineated into private and public stockpiling. The Japanese stockpiling 
target was set to 60 days, comprising 42 days as a national stockpiling target and 18 days as a 
private stockpiling target, to fully and adequately meet domestic demand according to data 
published by JOGMEC.  
With respect to selecting the appropriate types and quantities of REEs, JOGMEC has 
endeavored to enhance the current stockpiling system to enable it to be more flexible in 
locating and stockpiling the proper species of metal based on current market trends. An 
outstanding feature of JOGMEC’s strategy is their willingness to forge cooperative 
relationships with the private sector; even going so far as to set up a new committee for 
periodic monitoring of domestic inventories and the latest supply and demand trends on 
REEs, and allowing private sector companies to be involved in its administration. In addition 
to this cooperative system, JOGMEC also provides an efficient registration system to enable 
rare metals producers and manufacturing companies to purchase REEs according to their 
requirements (JOGMEC, 2013: 29). 
Although Japan’s confidential policies around their strategies and contracts makes it difficult 
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to extract complete information on the species of mineral resources they are invested in 
stockpiling, we can infer that they are particularly concentrated on nine metals – chromium, 
cobalt, gallium, indium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, tungsten, and vanadium – for 
managing as stockpiled materials, as JOGMEC's annual report in 2009 strongly indicates 
(RPA, 2012: Annex A-11). 
3.2. United States of America 
The basic goals of the U.S’s mineral policy were aptly described in a research paper 
published by the Congressional Research Service in 2013 as being the promotion of an 
adequate, stable, and reliable supply of materials for the national security, economic well-
being, and long-term industrial production of the US (Humphries, M.2013:1). 
For the purposes of reforming their current predicament, which is somewhat vulnerable to 
market disruptions and incapable of supporting a stable, reliable supply of mineral resources, 
the US's policies have taken the form of four specific strategic frameworks: boosting 
domestic production, reducing dependency by diversification of supply and the development 
of new technologies, transforming the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) into a broader 
strategic materials security program, and making open complaints about Chinese export 
restrictions to the WTO (WFF, 2011:36). 
3.2.1. Boosting of domestic production 
Figure 4, provided by GAO in 2010, shows that the history of the US Rare Earth Industry 
began with the discovery of large rare earth deposits in 1949. In a sense, Mountain Pass mine 
in California, owned by Molycorp, once supplied most of the world's REEs; and that alone 
fully represents that period of US history on REEs. The United States’ REE capacity for 
manufacturing technology surpassed China’s, even to the extent that by the mid-1980s they 
were able to manage every stage of rare earth materials processing, in spite of discovering 
them later than China (GAO, 2010). 
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Figure 4: History of the US Rare Earth industry 
  Source: GAO. 2010. p17 
The overwhelming influence of Mountain Pass mine on the global REE industry began to 
decline from the 1990s, due to a decrease of profits as a result of increased Chinese 
production, as well as heightened concerns around environmental pollution; until in 2002 
Molycorp shut down its major operating facilities. As a result, the US has become almost 100% 
reliant on China's REEs since its domestic products were simply insufficient to satisfy the 
increasing demands of its industry (WFF, 2011:27). Nonetheless, the operability of the closed 
mine must have been maintained, evidenced by the fact the mine operations were resumed in 
order to separate bastnasite concentrates from stockpiles produced before the shutdown in 
2007. Indeed, given that Mountain Pass mine has the capacity to produce approximately 
18,143 metric tons of rare earth oxide per year, its revitalization in 2012 was somewhat 
inevitable (WFF, 2011:29). However, even more than its production capacity, the real reasons 
that forced the US to reopen Mountain Pass mine in 2012 can be explained through the 
following cases (Cho, R. 2012). 
Specifically, one incident surrounding a trial of NdFeB magnets in 1995 made an indelible 
impression on the US, and took over the Unocal by CNOOC in 2005 (Kim, D.H, 2011:129). 
A magnet named NdFeB possessing permanent magnetic properties was discovered by 
scientists from General Motors (GM) in 1983. As the size of the magnet was small enough to 
be used in its vehicles, GM established a production factory called Magnequench as a 
subsidiary company in 1986 to commercialize the magnet. Afterward, the factory line was 
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sold to Sextant Group Inc., practically owned by Chinese companies after being reviewed by 
the Clinton government in 1995 under the condition to keep Magnequench in the US for at 
least five years (Hurst 2011). As soon as the compulsory term was expired, Sextant started to 
move the company's operational facilitates from the US into China gradually from 2000 and 
finalized its movement in 2003. Probably, the effect of the transfer would not have given a 
big shock to America at the time because the value of REEs remained lower than at present. 
However, by 2010 China had become the world's largest producer of NdFeB, accounting for 
75% of the total global production; a fact that must have caused the US to re-evaluate the 
magnet and REEs more precisely (Kim, D.H, 2011:131). The public statement by Karl 
Gschneidner that "they are all sorry about that mistake…as the business went, technology 
went”, plainly confirms how lax the US's policy was in the past on REEs (Hurst.2011). 
In addition to these two cases, China's recently enforced policies on REEs would play an 
major role in catalyzing the revitalization of the Mountain Pass mine, as the US will never be 
in a position to undervalue the unusual metals essential to making high-tech military 
equipment or products (WSJ, 2010). As an example, the requirement for the US to secure a 
stable REE supply chain is closely connected with the matter of national security, in that the 
military application for REEs is much wider in the US than in any other country. With 
widespread use in high-tech military equipment such as jet-fighter engines, missile guidance 
systems, antimissile defense, and space-based satellites, the US Congress in 2010 declared 
them to be materials either strategic or critical to national security (WFF, 2011:26). 
3.2.2. Critical Minerals Strategy 
Along with the resumption of Mountain Pass mine productivity, the US has developed a 
strategy to tackle the issues surrounding strategic raw materials, since the terms 'critical 
minerals' and 'strategic minerals' entered US policy lexicon with the Strategic and Critical 
Materials Stock Piling Act in 1939 (WFF, 2011:23).  
The current direction of the US's policies is reflected in a document, the Critical Raw 
Materials (CRM) Strategy, released in 2010 by the Department of Energy (DOE), a 




 Diversifying supply chains through globalizing for strategic materials  
 Developing substitutes and promoting recycling 
 Improving re-use and efficient methodology for strategic materials 
Apart from the lessons on methods for optimally securing supply chains which we can gain 
from studying the similarities between the strategic approaches of the US and Japan in 
relation to the components of their mineral policies, another very intriguing development in 
the US's policies is that their traditional policy which originally focused on national defense 
is undergoing a change into a Strategic Materials Security Program. The aims of this 
transformation are to enhance the ability of the US to adapt strategically to developments in 
the minerals market and to ensure availability of strategic minerals for military and economic 
purpose (WFF, 2011:35). One paper, the CRM Strategy published by DOE, emphasized that 
REEs and other minerals are crucial for the development of clean energy technologies – a 
statement that confirms the transformation of the US's mineral polices (Raquel Quaresma de 
Lima, 2012:6). This changing trend shows that the value of REEs as a growth engine is 
increasing. It is also instructive to evaluate several acts of the US legislature (comprising the 
Senate and the House of Representatives) related to strategic non-fuel minerals, as outlined in 
table 8. This list of acts provides a valuable insight into the ways in which US mineral 
policies have gradually shifted direction in the ways discussed above (WFF, 2011:33-34). 
Table 8: Summary of Contemporary Legislation 





17 March 2010 
- Establishing a domestic supply cycle 
for REEs: re-establish a competitive 
domestic rare earths minerals 
production industry, a domestic REE 
processing, refining, purification and 
metals production industry and a 
domestic rare earth metal based magnet 









- Establishing a Rare Earth Policy Task 
Force to monitor and assist federal 
agencies in expediting the review and 
approval of permits to accelerate the 
completion of projects that will increase 
investments in, exploration for, and 
development of domestic rare earths. 
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H.R.6160 Rare Earths and 
Critical Materials 






- Developing an REE program, to amend 
the National Materials and Mineral 
Policy, R&D Act of 1980. 
P.L. 111-84, the Fiscal Year 
2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act 
Unidentified Unidentified 
- Determining the extent of US mineral 
vulnerability. 
- Measuring to determine which specific 
military weapons systems currently 
depend on REEs to alleviate potential 
threats to national security. 




- Assessing of the REE supply chain and 
determine which materials are strategic 
or critical to national security. 
- Ensuring the long term availability of 
these materials by 2015. 
- Establishing of a domestic source of 
sintered NdFeB for defense systems. 
Source: Collected from the ' The Library of Congress (http://thomas.loc.gov)' by author 
Reading through this list, it becomes clear that these acts are all designed to adhere to the 
US's requirement to enhance technology through the use of REEs, and ensure national 
security through establishing a reliable stable chain of REEs.   
3.2.3. Stockpiling 
The NDS of the U.S was instituted to provide a secure supply of strategic and critical 
materials to support the military industry and essential private sector needs in times of 
national emergency, as mandated by the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act 
established in 1939. According to this law, the strategic and critical materials were labeled as 
those that "would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of 
the US during a national emergency, and are not found or produced in the US in sufficient 
quantities to meet such need"(RPA, 2012: Annex A-21). 
The Footprint of the NDS is described in table 9, which shows the historical list of prescribed 



















































 Source: Modified from the 'WFF.2011.p25' by author 
As the table shows, the list of designated materials has not remained static, but has varied 
drastically over time since the period from 1970s to 1980s. The NDS’s reasoning behind the 
drastic evolution of their strategy is described in a report entitled "Managing Materials for a 
21st Century Military" published in 2008 by the National Research Council. The report 
pointed out that the current mechanism of NDS is disconnected from the actual national 
defense material needs due to the unrealistic evaluation system, and recommended a new 
approach which can identify the materials needs of the military based on the risk of 
disruptions to mitigate the impact of surges in requirements and unexpected shortfalls in 
inputs (RPA, 2012: Annex A-21). 
As a result, based on the National Research Council's recommendation the US DOD 
published a report in 2009 containing both the revision of DOD's current policy for the 
disposal of stockpiled materials and the reconfiguration of the NDS to respond thoroughly to 
evolving conditions in the global market and to changing requirements for both traditional 
and new materials, as the central components of its revised direction. In essence, the 
recommended solution was to build a wide-ranging Strategic Materials Security Program that 
would identify, on an on-going basis, a set of strategic and critical materials to meet the 
specified requirements of national security. The key factors of the reconfiguration can be 
summarized as the following (RPA, 2012: Annex A-22): constant surveillance of global of the 
global marketplace to assess its constantly changing materials needs, maintaining a dynamic 
list of material needs, assessment of the reliability of various countries, and risk mitigation 
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strategies to ensure material availability. 
The factors of this reconfiguration illustrate the ways in which the US's stockpiling 
management policy with respect to mineral resources has undergone a drastic evolution from 
their past inflexibility, to emulate the flexibility and extemporaneity of the Japanese model, to 
meet the constantly fluctuating conditions of the marketplace. In addition, the US shares 
another commonality with Japan, in seeking to make use of a private stockpiling system as a 
buffer zone to supply stockpile minerals in the event of national emergencies (RPA, 2012: 
Annex A-23). 
3.2.4. Bringing a WTO case against China's policies on REEs 
The restrictive policies of China - "export quotas, export duties, minimum export price 
requirements, export licensing, and export quota administration requirements on certain raw 
materials" – were sufficiently alarming that the US including other complaints such as EU, 
Japan, which rely heavily on China’s REEs, responded with strong resistance by filing a 
WTO case against China over export restraints on raw materials (USTR, 2011). The US 
complained that China's export restraints could create scarcity and cause higher prices of raw 
materials, which would provide the Chinese domestic industry with a significant advantage 
through both over supply and by lowering and stabilizing their domestic prices for raw 
materials. China defended itself by insisting that some of its export duties and quotas can be 
justified in order to conserve its exhaustible natural resources as well as for the protection of 
the health of its residents caused by environmental pollution (WTO, 2013). 
The battle between the complainants and China surrounding REEs does not appear to have 
any easy resolution, because the differences in their opinions expressed since 2009 in the 
WTO are of a great magnitude; this despite several impactful decisions made at the WTO, as 









23 June 2009 The US's requesting consultation with China with respect to China's restraints on the export from China of various forms of raw materials 
Raw 
Materials 
2 July 2009 EU's requesting to join the consultations 
6 July 2009 The requesting of Canada, Mexico, and Turkey to join the consultations 
4 November 2009 The US's requesting the establishment of a panel 
21 December 
2009 The establishment of a panel 
5 July 2011 The panel concluded in the circulated report that China's restrictions on raw materials are inconsistent with WTO rule 
31 August 2011 China notified the Dispute Settlement Body(DSB) of its decision to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations of the panel report 
30 January 2012 
The appellate body report was circulated 
- contrary to the Panel's findings, the AB saw nothing in the text of 
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 to suggest that, in addition to being 
“made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption”, a trade restriction must be aimed at 
ensuring the effectiveness of domestic restrictions, as the Panel found 
22 February 2012 DSB adopted the appellate body report and the panel report, as modified by the AB report 
17 January 2013 Implementation of adopted reports 
13 March 2012 US's requesting consultations with China with respect to China's restrictions on the export of various forms of Rare earth 
REEs 
22 March 2012 EU and Japan requested to join the consultation 
27 June 2012 The US's requesting the establishment of a panel 
23 July 2012 The establishment of a panel 
26 March 2014 The panel concluded that China's trading rights restrictions breach its WTO obligations 
25 April 2014 China filed a notice of appeal in rare earth disputes 




Unless one of these parties is willing to concede ground on its own arguments, the unceasing 
disputes between the major importers and the monopoly supplier of raw materials including 
REEs is expected to continue in the WTO arena into the future. The predictability of these 
outcomes leads to a disturbing conclusion, that China’s policies will only continue to reduce 
REEs, and that as a result resource poor nations have an urgent requirement to prepare 
themselves for ongoing shortages of mineral resources. This can take the shape of boosting 
their recycling industry, expanding investment in R&D to facilitate the development of 
alternative resources, and enhancing cooperative partnerships with resource-rich countries, in 
order to secure a stable supply chain. 
3.3. European Union 
Like many other countries lacking in mineral resources, the pressures arising from a growing 
scarcity of REEs will place a large burden upon the EU. In particular, the responsibility of the 
EU to protect the environment through promoting green technologies such as the spread of 
solar and wind energy as well as the reduction of carbon emissions will place a constraint on 
its REE supply; as well as its mission of enhancing competitiveness in global markets by 
fostering high-tech industries. Moreover, another challenge that the EU needs to address 
urgently is the institution of an integrated system to overcome the disparate and fragmented 
mineral policies belonging to its Member States. Accordingly, the outline of the Raw 
Materials Initiative (RMI) published in November 2008 and carried out by the European 
Commission (EC) demonstrates both the EU's attempts to overcome those challenges and 
policy directions and its ambitions to secure a supply of strategic raw materials. With regard 
to the necessity of creating a stockpiling program, the autonomous systems based on 
respective Member States will provide the EC with sufficient time to consider its validity in 
depth. 
3.3.1. Challenges 
Besides the issues caused by its resources shortage, which are common to all resource poor 
countries, two more factors unique to the European regulatory framework prevent the EU 
from building a stable supply chain of mineral resources: the strictness of mineral regulations 
and the absence of a centralized and coordinated policy. 
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Firstly, the EU's environmental standards are much more complicated than any other country 
due to the 0numerous legislative and regulatory measures based on national and regional 
procedures and policies enacted by each Member State, which create an arduous and 
prolonged process of application and approval for mining exploration to access new sources 
of internal raw materials (Crowson, P.C.F. 2008).  
As the development of new mines has been delayed by these laborious regulations, mining 
activities in the EU have been driven by existing enterprises to easily obtain permission for 
infrastructure expansion (Tiess, G. 2010:193). In addition, several warnings related to the 
depletion of EU resources indicate that the EU’s current situation is unable to satisfy 
increasing demand and support the growth of high-tech industries. 
Furthermore, it is an unfortunate fact that EU mineral policies have more independent and 
fragmented features than other countries, since each Member State has favored protectionist 
policies towards their own national industries, contrary to a centralized and coordinated 
policy. The disharmony of these policies can be evidenced by the fact that the European Coal 
and Steel Community of the 1950s and for decades since that time did not consider the supply 
of raw materials for the European economy as a primary goal of its common policy (Tiess, G. 
2010:192). As a consequence, the EU’s institutional capacity in relation to mineral resources 
has been unfortunately rather limited (Gerber, L.2012: 4). 
3.3.2. The EU Raw Materials Initiative 
Through attempting to address these fundamental challenges to build sustainable supply 
frameworks to cope with the volatile global raw materials environment, the EC suggested the 
RMI as a common EU mineral policy in November 2008 (OFSE, 2013:6).  
The outlines of the RMI in table 11 show the three pillars of the EU's directions to address 
three primary issues: ensuring the accessibility of raw materials in the global marketplace, 
fostering an environment to generate a sustainable internal supply, and increasing resource 




Table 11: Three pillars of Raw Material Initiative 
First Pillar Second Pillar Third Pillar 
Access to raw materials on world 
markets at distorted conditions 
Foster sustainable supply of raw 
materials from European sources 
Reduce own consumption of 
primary raw materials 
- Pursuing raw materials 
diplomacy to secure access to 
raw materials 
- Promoting enhanced 
international cooperation 
through G8, OECD, 
UNCTAD, UNEP, World 
Bank, etc. 
- Prioritizing the matter of trade 
and regulatory policy 
- Enabling win-win situations 
for fostering undistorted 
access to raw materials 
 
- Facilitating a sustainable 
supply from European 
deposits 
- Improving the knowledge 
base of mineral deposits 
within the EU 
- Improving networking 
between the national 
geological surveys 
- Promoting research projects in 
relation to extraction and 
processing of raw materials 
- Dealing with the growing 
problem of skills shortage 
- Prompting of resource 
efficiency and eco-innovative 
production processes  
- Boosting the use or recycling 
of products 
- Implementation and 








Source: Modified from 'OFSE.2013.p7 & EC Homepage (http://ec.europa.eu)' by author 
3.3.2.1. First Pillar 
Given that the EU is currently faced with a substantial shortfall in their short-term access to 
mineral resources, enhancing its resource diplomacy is currently their best strategy to 
increase the accessibility of raw materials. This in contrast to pursuing the second and third 
pillars of their core strategy, since it has the ability to produce outputs in a shorter period of 
time than the other goals which require significantly more time and effort to achieve. In order 
to maximize the accessibility of raw materials with undistorted conditions, the diplomatic 
strategies of the EU have been implemented in four frameworks (EC: 2008): 
 Building a comprehensive diplomatic relationship with three parties: Africa, 
emerging resource-rich countries (such as China and Russia), resource-dependent 
countries (such as the US and Japan) by reinforcing dialogue and joint actions. 
 Promoting of international cooperation to raise awareness of raw materials through 
activities in OECD, UNCTAD and UNEP, and to explore opportunities for 
cooperation with international organizations such as World Bank. 
 Improving undistorted trade and regulatory policies by promoting new rules and 
agreements to ensure compliance with international commitments at the multilateral 
and at bilateral levels. 
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 Enabling win-win situations that foster undistorted access to raw materials by 
assisting developing countries with abundant natural resources to transform their 
availability of mineral resources into inclusive economic growth. 
3.3.2.2. Second Pillar 
In contrast, the Second Pillar emphasizes the reconstitution of the EU's internal regulatory 
environment to foster a sustainable supply of raw materials. With a view to facilitating the 
sustainable supply of mineral resources by internal efforts, the EU attempts to enforce 
cooperation amongst its Member States for a thriving mineral industry via the following steps 
(EC: 2008): 
 Streamlining its administrative conditions and speeding up the permits process for 
accessibility to land in order to improve exploration and extraction activities.  
 Creating cooperative systems of geological surveying by building a knowledge base 
of mineral deposits, establishing networking in relation to the extraction and 
processing of mineral resources 
 Tackling challenges related to skills shortages and limited public awareness of the 
available domestic raw materials by building effective partnerships between 
universities, geological surveys and industries. 
3.3.2.3. Third Pillar 
In addition, the EU has made a concerted effort to reduce the consumption of primary raw 
materials by fostering recycling through a variety of methods (EC: 2008):  
 Promoting research projects that focus on resource-efficient products and production 
methods. 
 Ensuring sound and harmonized enforcement of the Waste Shipment Regulation to 
prevent loss of valuable secondary raw materials. 
 Full implementation and enforcement of relevant recycling legislations through a 
series of new provisions in the Waste Framework Directive. 
3.3.2.4. The implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative 
The EC incorporated its divergent strategies into a unified framework consisting of three 
pillars, which enabled it to respond in an appropriate manner to the various challenges around 
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accessing non-energy raw materials (EC: 2013, 2014).  
 Pillar 1: Reinforcing Raw Materials Trade Strategy, diversifying raw material 
dialogues, and fostering diplomatic relationships with a wide range of countries (such 
as the US, Japan, Russia, Argentina, Brazil and China), and building win-win 
situations with developing countries to enable their own developmental goals (such 
as the Joint Africa-EU strategy and African, Caribbean and Pacific). The framework 
for cooperation between the EU and the African Union focuses on three areas: 
governance, investment and infrastructure, and geological knowledge and skills. 
 
 Pillar 2: Facilitating exchange of best practices for promoting investment in 
extractive industries, enhancing and improving EU knowledge base, promoting 
research and skills, and launching of seabed mining study. 
 
 Pillar 3: Better implementation and enforcement of existing EU waste legislation to 
promote recycling & resource-efficiency, strengthen the enforcement of the waste 
shipment regulation, and boost resource efficiency and increase the amount of 
recycling.  
3.3.3. The identification of Critical Raw Materials 
Along with RMI, the EU has since 2010 identified a subset of CRM to tackle the uncertainty 
of the supply risk, based on measuring of the degree of the economic importance and the 
supply risk as seen in figure 5 (EC report on CRM, 2014):  
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Figure 5: The identification criteria of Critical Raw Materials 
Source: EC. 2014. Report of the Ad hoc Working Group on defining CRM. p33 
The first critical analysis for raw materials was conducted by the Ad-Hoc Working Group on 
Defining CRM, and 14 CRM were identified from a candidate group of 41 non-energy, non-
agricultural materials in 2010. The second analysis was conducted in 2013 through an intense 
cooperation between the EC, the Ad hoc Working Group on Defining CRM and consultants 
from Oakdene Hollins, Frauhofer ISI and Roskill; and 20 CRM were identified from an 
extended list which included seven new biotic materials and three biotic materials, as 
illustrated in table 12. Due to a lower supply risk, tantalum was excluded from the list of 14 
CRM in 2010, while 6 CRM (borates, chromium, coking coal, magnesite, phosphate rock and 
silicon metal) were included to the list (EC report on CRM, 2014). 
Table 12: The identification of Raw Materials Initiative (2010 and 2013) 











Antimony (China 87%) 
Beryllium (USA 90%) 
Borates (Turkey 38%, USA 30%) 
Chromium (SA 43%, Kazakhstan 20%) 
Cobalt (DRC 56%) 
Coking coal (China 51%) 
Fluorspar (China 56%) 
Gallium (China 69%) 
Germanium (China 59%) 













Magnesite (China 69%) 
Magnesium (China 86%) 
Natural Graphite (China 69%) 
Niobium (Brazil 92%) 
PGMs (SA 61%, Russia 27%) 
Phosphate Rock (China 38%) 
Heavy REEs (China 99%) 
Light REEs (China 87%) 
Silicon Metal (China 56%) 
Tungsten (China 85%) 
Source: Report on CRM for the EU (2014) 
The worldwide distribution of the major producers of 20 critical CRM not only shows clearly 
just how influential China's power has become, and the extent to which it could impact 
economically on the 14 CRM in the global market, but also explains why the EU identified 
its list of 20 CRM focusing on both their economic importance and their potential supply risk. 
Although the reassessment was conducted three years from the first analysis, the data 
produced from the evaluative system which measured the degree of supply risk as a global 
forecast clearly demonstrated the need to produce a flexible system of mineral resource 
procurement and management, in the same manner as the US and Japan. The EC's publication 
of the list of 20 CRM and the implementation of RMI in May 2014 also show that the 
strategic direction of the EU's mineral polices is becoming integrated to meet the goals set by 
RMI.  
3.3.4. Stockpiling 
According to a key announcement in 2011, the EC signaled that it was "ready to examine 
with Member States and industry the added value and feasibility of a possible stockpiling 
program of raw materials". In this regard, the EU contracted a company to carry out a study 
to identify the potential desirability, feasibility and cost benefit of a stockpiling program. The 
study eventually reached the conclusion that to organize a voluntary stockpiling initiative 
from the private sector could be an appropriate option with public financial support due to 
their acknowledgement that the shortage of raw materials could be tackled through structural 
solutions (such as substitution development, recycling, and domestic production) with a long-
term perspective. The EC’s inflexibility in its ability to address volume requirements 
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timeously could bring about a substantial budgetary deficit in implementation, and redressing 
this shortfall would require a perfect knowledge of value chains, the uses of each raw 
material, and processing facilities. Although the Commission had an opportunity to discuss 
the results of the study in 2011, due to some disagreements around the necessity of 
stockpiling program among its Member States the issue has remained unresolved by the 
Commission, which appears to be hamstrung until now on this matter (EC, 2013:3-4). 
3.4. Korea 
The efforts undertaken by Korea to secure a stable supply chain for REEs – namely, vitalizing 
resource diplomacy to procure overseas resources, an improved stockpile system, fostering of 
a recycling environment, and developing alternative materials – are inevitable given their 
lack of mineral resources. These efforts are also comparable to the strategies taken by other 
countries with a combination of both limited minerals and a technology-driven industrial 
environment, which urgently requires an abundance of mineral resources to compete in 
manufacturing.  
Nonetheless, the outcomes of their efforts cannot be achieved in the short term due to late 
diplomatic efforts and undeveloped material technology compared to China and Japan. With a 
view to overcoming both of these problems and challenges presented by China's restrictive 
REE policies, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) in 2010 drafted a proposal 
entitled "Plans for Stable Procurement of Rare Metals”. Korea's mechanism in relation to 
REE can be crystallized into four primary aims – expansion of overseas mining investment, 
development of domestic mineral resources, enhancing R&D activities for materialization, 
and circulating technology to build infrastructure. 
3.4.1. Efforts to secure overseas resources for supply chain diversification 
The Korea Resources Corporation (KORES), a state-run body established in 1967, has 
carried out a strategy of resource diplomacy with a goal of reducing heavy dependence on 
imports of China's REEs through supply chain diversification, by a number of means such as 
ODA, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), dispatching investigation teams, and establishing 
cooperative relationships. According to data provided by KORES, 35 MOUs have been 
signed with 17 countries possessing rich resources such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Australia, 
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Russia, and South Africa since 2003. However, those attempts received a poor evaluation 
from the relevant National Assembly Committee (NAC) due to the low rate of success 
originating from an inadequate feasibility and profitability study (YNA, 2013).  
For this reason, evaluators engaged in the evaluation of NAC pointed out that Korea would 
need to improve its internal analysis methodologies to effectively evaluate the feasibility and 
profitability of mineral resources prior to initiating negotiations with rich-resources countries, 
if it hoped to produce materially beneficial outcomes. 
3.4.2. Development of domestic mining 
Efforts to procure REEs within mineral resources have been implemented by the Korean 
Institute of Geo-science and Mineral Resources (KIGAM). The outcomes of the study were 
announced on 30 June 2011 by KIGAM, which analyzed soil samples gathered from 11 
locations around the country, and found two major deposits of REEs from Hongcheon in 
Gang-won Province and Chung-ju in North Chung-cheong Province which were estimated to 
produce about 150,000 tons – enough to satisfy Korea’s demands adequately for the next 50 
years (CHOSUNILBO, 2011). Nevertheless, the extraction of REEs will be delayed for a 
long time because of a number of complex procedures that need to be carried out before 
starting production, such as conducting a profitability study and enacting a series of 
environmental protection laws. In relation to extraction, in order to decide whether the two 
deposits will materialize, the MKE unveiled its plans in 2011 to evaluate the economic value 
of the deposits (EKN, 2011). 
3.4.3. Enhancement of R&D and recycling 
One major R&D challenge for Korea is that it has never developed a sufficiently mature 
infrastructure with which to both foster the material and component industries of REEs and to 
investigate alternative materials for REEs. In order to overcome its excessive dependence on 
foreign end-product components, Korea has attempted to improve technical partnerships with 
other countries by either signing MOU or mutual agreements. 
 The signing of a MOU between the council of REE manufacturers in Korea and the 
Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths in China for conducting mutual research 
programs on REE manufacturing technology by assisting with research facilities and 
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equipment, providing necessary information, and exchanging human resources (YNA, 
2011). 
 
 The signing of a MOU between KORES and Mintek, established as a minerals 
research laboratory by the government of SA in 1934, for cooperative research to 
develop technology for separating, smelting, and processing REEs; as well as mutual 
endeavors to develop and explore the potential of South African mineral resources 
(FINANTIAL NEWS, 2011). 
 
 A mutual agreement between MKE and the Agency for Natural Resources and 
Energy of Japan for technological development in the area of recycling and 
exploiting mines based in third-world countries (DongA.com, 2010).  
Besides those attempts to reinforce international research activities, the process of 
reconfiguring Korea’s internal conditions to create an optimal environment that can support 
integrated REE research activities has already made some serious strides (MKE, 2010).  
 To support the research activities of the REE industry efficiently, the Korean 
government established Korea Institute for Rare Metals (KIRAM) on 28 January 
2010. The role of KIRAM as a center of REE research was initiated through the 
launch of four primary frameworks: developing of resources and stockpiling, 
fostering the materials industry, facilitating national recycling, and building of 
Industry-University-Institute research networks. 
 
 Besides establishing KIRAM, MKE has invested in the expansion of infrastructure 
for the training and development of highly skilled manpower. For this initiative, 
MKE designated Kongju and Sunchon universities with another four academies as 
specialized centers of learning for producing minerals experts through the use of 
educational programs to contribute to the wider field of technology-based employees 
within Korean companies. 
Korea's efforts to vitalize its recycling industry have been guided by ‘The law of resource 
preservation and fostering recycling' established in 1992 (MGL, 2014). According to section 
7 of the law, the Ministry of Environment (ME) and another four related ministries in 2011 
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devised an integrated plan collaboratively entitled "The First Plan of Resource Recycling 
from 2011 to 2015" with an awareness that Korea lacks the sufficiently developed technology 
to enable an economically viable recycling industry, despite having made improvements to its 
technology to within 70% of the capacity of more developed countries. To achieve the 
specific goals of the plan – the development of high value REE recycling technologies, the 
acquisition of global technology for re-energizing end-of-life resources, and the streamlining 
of R&D programs – the Korean government will implement the draft by stages until the 
technology for resource recycling reaches 90-95% of the capacity of developed countries by 
2020, and occupies 6% of the global market share by 2030 (ME, 2011: 115).  
3.4.4. Stockpiling 
The goal of Korea’s stockpiling, as a resource poor country, is to ensure a reliable supply 
chain for supporting its critical industries such as automobile, electronics, and steel 
manufacturing with on-going stability. With a view to managing its stockpiling system 
effectively, KORES and the Korean Public Procurement Service (PPS) have each run a 
stockpiling system. The types of minerals were decided by an administrative meeting to 
determine the functions of stockpiling, held in February 2007 (Newspim, 2011). Accordingly, 
the PPS has undertaken stockpiling efforts to meet a set of economic and strategic goals, 
particularly around 15 types of mineral (RPA, 2012: Annex A-15):  
 Non-ferrous metal group: Copper, Aluminum, Lead, Zinc, Tin, Nickel 
 Nine additional minerals: Silicon, Manganese, Cobalt, Vanadium, Indium, Lithium, 
Bismuth, Strontium, Tantalum 
Meanwhile, KORES has managed to stockpile 10 types of minerals to meet its strategic goals 
(RPA, 2012: A-17-19): Antimony, Niobium, REEs, Tungsten, Chromium, Molybdenum, 
Selenium, Titanium, and two unidentified types. 
The allocated period for stockpiling was determined to be 60 days, which breaks down into 
order and load (30 days), delivery by sea (25 days), delivery at local warehouse (5 days) 
according to the rules set by KORES (RPA, 2012: A-16).  
In order to enhance its own stockpiling system, the Korean government has constantly 
increased its budget and related ministries – PPS, KORES, and Ministry of Trade, Industry 
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and Energy (MOTIE, previously MKE and changed name in March 2013) - signed a MOU 
for an effective stockpiling for collaborating efforts (KGPG, 2013). 
3.5. Comparative conclusions on REE importer strategies 
We can draw a number of conclusions from studying these diverse governmental efforts to 
create an optimal model to respond to the REE supply problem; for instance, some ways to 
prepare for and overcome future shortage of resources in the global market, and some 
possible policy models to create mutual benefits between importers and exporters of mineral 
resources. As each country’s situation has some common denominators, their responses to 
these issues are similar and collectively valuable for a country in a similar position to Korea, 
which urgently needs to build a stable supply chain to prepare for emergency situations. 
Firstly, concerning the matter of securing overseas resources, the balanced and inclusive 
approach developed in Japan and the EU should be considered a model for other countries to 
follow. As a nation with a developed materials industry, Japan has a balanced structure 
linking the public and private sector. In the cooperative mechanism between its sectors, the 
government has expanded its resource territory by assisting infrastructure development near 
mining areas through the ODA policy, and has encouraged the private sector to act 
aggressively to secure overseas resources by providing financial incentives. The 
achievements of the private sector demonstrated the value of their well-developed systems to 
mitigate volatile market situations, through building partnerships with foreign countries that 
enabled them to avoid an overly heavy dependence on the government. In addition, the first 
pillar of RMI denotes that the comprehensiveness of the EU's resources diplomacy to 
maximize their stated outcomes – securing resources from emerging resource-rich countries, 
improving distorted market environments, and accelerating exchange of information related 
to common interests – by reinforcing dialogue and joining actions with many countries across 
the political, geographical, and economic spectrum. 
Secondly, a number of endeavors have involved attempting to vitalize domestic products to 
secure a stable supply chain of REEs. From the viewpoint of rich-resource countries, these 
attempts would be closely connected with the vitalization of their domestic mining industries. 
Examples include the reopening of the Mountain Pass mine in 2012, which was closed since 
2007 due to the deterioration of profitability, and the EU’s efforts to improve its internal 
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regulatory hindrances such as strict regulations and fragmented policies between Member 
States to facilitate the production of its mines. The mistake made by the US in shutting down 
and later reopening Mountain Pass mine must have impressed upon them the need for strict 
evaluation of economic profitability from a long-term perspective to prevent unnecessary 
waste of time and finance. Moreover, the EU’s example can offer a lesson to nations 
preparing new mining developments concerning the significance of a strict regulatory 
environment prior to the extraction of minerals.  
By contrast, the focus of resource poor nations must be not only towards developing their 
mining efforts, but also strongly promoting urban recycling and developing new technologies 
to reduce the amount of mineral resources used in their manufacturing processes. In particular 
Japan's efforts to reduce their dependencies upon particular minerals used for the electronic 
and automobile industry demonstrate that it would be more useful to promote reduction 
technology rather than merely recycling in the short term. The underlining of resource 
efficiency in Pillar 3 of the EU’s policies again shows through their research that the former 
method is more effective than the latter to solve a shortage of resources in a reduced period of 
time. Nonetheless, the value of recycling is very significant, to the extent that Japan has 
termed it 'urban mining’, and has expended considerable resources towards its recycling 
technologies. Their positive experiences must impress on similar nations the importance of 
developing recycling technology to extract minerals from end-of-life products, as this 
approach could supply a lot of mineral resources – even potentially as much as the quantities 
from domestic mines. 
Thirdly, nurturing R&D activities around REEs is by far the most important task, as it can 
produce two significant outcomes – the development of substitutes and the fostering of the 
materials industry – which can become a cornerstone of a sustainable economy. As previously 
stated, the fact that every country considers the enhancement of R&D on REEs as a new 
growth engine means that it has the potential even to create a thriving and diverse industry of 
small businesses. The Japanese model involves both a cooperative mechanism connecting 
industry, university, and government, and an organic structure to lead research results into 
final products. Unquestionably, the allocation of common research projects between 
universities and private companies as portrayed in Appendix must give them an opportunity 
to cooperate with one another to maximize the effectiveness of the research outcomes. 
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Moreover, their model which links industry, university, and government has the capacity to 
efficiently create a diverse range of small businesses which require knowledge, financial, or 
technological support, as they can receive important assistance through the cooperative 
system. Given that promoting small businesses could produce a lot of jobs, and producing 
jobs is a cornerstone of sustainable development, Japan's model warrants serious attention 
from countries seeking economic growth through promoting industrial technologies. 
Lastly, the merits of the stockpiling mechanism – its balanced structure and flexible 
evaluation system – in the systems of Japan and the US are immensely valuable for countries 
aiming to build systems for managing their own stockpiling. Firstly, the supplementary 
system that was developed between the private and public sector was shown to be more 
stable than a purely government-run system, as it has the ability to supplement its supply 
chain more effectively, and is more resilient to volatile market situations.  
When viewed from the economic perspective, a cooperative system makes more financial 
sense to the private sector, as they can more effectively store and manage essential minerals 
in the event of an emergency by reducing wastage from improper mineral choices. The fact 
that the materials industry was developed in Japan also explains why Japan became more 
vulnerable to a lack of resources than countries heavily reliant on the import of materials, and 
explains why Japan built its supplementary stockpiling system. For this reason, to countries 
envisioning the development of a materials industry, the stockpiling system built by Japan 
could provide an optimal model for resilience against fluctuating market conditions. 
Moreover, beyond the need for resilience, the need to institute a systemic flexibility that is 
able to evaluate and purchase types of minerals according to market conditions is exemplified 
in three countries – Japan, the US, and the EU (despite the latter’s managing CRM not by 
stockpiling but by RMI). This experience in reducing factors of waste caused by choosing 
unsuitable materials for the market’s trends is an invaluable template for the ROW. 
Furthermore, Japan's establishing of a committee consisting of both public and private 
members to periodically monitor domestic inventories and current trends related to REE 
supply and demand is a lynchpin of Japanese policy to enable them to form a secure and 
stable supply chain. 
However, whereas we can find a multitude of international responses to the first dilemma, the 
second major issue – creating a useful and mutually beneficial diplomatic model between 
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importers and exporters of mineral resources – requires some originality and fresh 
perspective, as there is an absence of ready examples from which to draw a ready framework.   
One of the goals expressed in the first pillar of RMI may offer a plausible insight for 
producing a cooperative model in that the EU's diplomatic strategy for building win-win 
situations by assisting developing countries with abundant natural resources to transform 
their availability of mineral resources into their economic and inclusive growth. 
Despite the fact that many developing nations exist in Africa with greatly different 
circumstances, the generic knowledge gleaned from South Africa’s mineral policy is valuable 
in relation to the above goals, as it has articulated a clear national plan for economic growth, 
while its status as the biggest mineral asset holder in the African continent has gradually 
increased. In the same vein, the fact that the diplomatic strategies deployed by China, Japan, 
and Korea to procure mineral resources from Africa share some similarities with the EU's 
diplomatic direction implies that the cooperative model we are seeking would have a close 




SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COOPERATIVE MODEL 
4.1. South Africa 
4.1.1. The mineral resource of South Africa 
The position of SA as a supplier of mineral resource from a global perspective is not 
insignificant, as it has been assessed as the 5th largest mining economy behind China, US, 
Australia, and Brazil (Sibiya, 2012:8). According to a recent study conducted by Citibank, its 
generic value is estimated to be at least R28 trillion (19.6 billion Euros), which indicates that 
its value and position in the marketplace will only continue to expand as the potential for 
exploiting its resources becomes realized (DM, 2014). As seen in table 13, SA is a producer 
of major elemental resources including the four classes of minerals – PGMs (Platinum Group 
Metals), Titanium, Manganese, and Chromium – which are ranked first on the world market 
in 2013. 





SA World Ranking SA World Ranking 
Antimony Metric tons 27,000 5 4,200 5 
Chromium Thousand metric tons 200,000 2 11,000 1 
Gold Metric tons 6,000 2 145 6 
Iron ore Million metric tons 1,000 13 67 7 
Manganese Thousand metric tons 150,000 1 3,800 1 
Nickel Thousand metric tons 3,700 7 48 11 
PGMs Metric tons 63,000 1 222 1 
Titanium Thousand metric tons 63,000 3 1,100 1 
Vanadium Thousand metric tons 3,500 3 20 2 
Zirconium Thousand metric tons 14,000 2 360 2 
Source: Collected from the 'USGS. 2011' by author 
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The rising value of SA, due to an increasing awareness of its diverse and abundant mineral 
resources, has become an attraction which has drawn strong attention both from countries 
exploring overseas resources in order to build a stable supply chain as well as for its own 
domestic aims to achieve economic development. Particularly in the area of PGMs, where it 
possesses over 80% of the world’s reserves and produces an astounding 90% of the world’s 
supply, we can see an illustration of the crucial value of SA in the global minerals industry 
(MININGQ). SA leads the production and export of PGMs, which are critical for possessing 
the distinctive qualities of resistance to high temperatures and the ability to catalyze chemical 
reactions, and have no fungible counterparts in other minerals for the various industrial 
spheres in which they are needed. This includes the motor industry, where they used in 
catalytic convertors for turning harmful emissions into inert exhaust, and for making jewelry 
in the ornament markets. Furthermore, Ruthenium and Iridium, which belong to the class of 
PGMs, also are widely used for enabling vertical memory storage in hard drives and 
advanced lighting techniques. The fact that PGMs are used in such a range of high demand 
areas, with applicability across a spectrum of conveniences that have become indispensable 
in modern life, explains the significance of SA as one of the world’s leading providers of 
PGMs.  
Therefore, it is clear that SA has become a very important area of global interest, attracting 
enormous investments from developed countries such as the UK, US, Germany, Netherlands, 
and Japan with the objective of gaining a foothold in the extraction of its commodity 
resources, as illustrated in table 14; and with a particular concentration of that investment in 
its mineral resources, as described in table 15 (UNCTAD, 2008:581, 594).  




United States Germany Netherlands Japan 
Millions of Rand 440,257 37,378 34,121 22,106 14,725 




Table 15: The objectives of investment on South Africa (2006) 






250,361 165,432 162,521 16,172 13,809 1,983 29 
Source: UNCTAD. 2008. p594 
4.1.2. The content of South Africa's policy on mineral resources 
4.1.2.1. Socio-economic context of South Africa 
The major economic indicators in table 16 show that the economic growth rate of SA has 
increased steadily over the past few years. As a percentage of the total amount ($11,939) of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries, composed of 46 nations, South Africa’s 
GDP in 2012 ($4,199) accounted for 34.1% - a fact that clearly illustrates SA’s economic 
preeminence in Africa as the largest market among the African countries (KERI, 
2012:265,516). Nevertheless, the troublingly high unemployment rate, which remains at just 
over 25% in October 2014, denotes that there are severe, structural problems of economic 
inequality that need to be tackled at the national level (TE). 
Table 16: Major economic indicators (2012) 
Indicators Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP $ million 2,742 2,842 3,635 4,081 4,199 
GDP per capita $ 5,606 5,746 7,271 8,066 8,202 
Economic growth rate % 3.6 -1.5 2.9 3.1 2.3 
Industrial production 
growth rate 
% 0.6 -12.8 4.9 2.5 2.1 
Gross domestic 
investment/GDP 
% 22.5 19.6 19.3 19.9 - 
Unemployment rate % 22.9 23.9 24.9 24.5 23.8 
Consumer price 
growth rate 
% 11.5 7.1 4.3 5.0 5.3 
Source: KERI. 2012. p 256 
There has been, since the end of apartheid, a deep and persistent income gap between rich 
and poor, as seen in table 17. 
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Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
African 0.47 0.54 0.56 539 304 762 360 816 367 
Coloured 0.92 1.03 0.94 1072 795 1443 816 1381 800 
Indian 1.88 1.98 2.90 2148 1430 2625 1536 4288 1860 
White 4.06 4.82 4.27 4632 3418 6005 4170 6275 4188 
Overall 1 1 1 1147 419 1349 453 1456 450 
 Source: OECD.2010.p78 
A number of concerted efforts to narrow this discrepancy have been implemented in the post-
Apartheid period through national development projects, which have achieved some positive 
outcomes in terms of improving accessibility to basic services such as housing, water, 
electricity and sanitation, as depicted in table 18. 











1993 68.3% 59.3% 51.9% 45.2% 52.6% 
1999 74.2% 65.7% 69.5% 52.7% 55.5% 
2004 73.6% 67.8% 80.2% 59.4% 57.2% 
 Source: OECD.2010.p20 
4.1.2.2. South Africa's Mineral Policy and Socio-economic development 
The potential for SA's mineral resources to be used as an apparatus for fostering economic 
growth has been repeatedly emphasized in a number of documents embodying the direction, 
vision, and strategy of various national development projects: 
The national wealth of our country --- shall be restored to the people; the mineral 
wealth beneath the soil, --- (The Freedom Charter, 1955). 
Policies will be developed to integrate the mining industry with other sectors of the 
economy by encouraging mineral beneficiation and the creation of a world class 
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mining and mineral processing capital goods industry (Ready to Govern, 1992). 
Our economy must adjust to these pressures if we are to sustain economic growth and 
continue to develop a large domestic manufacturing sector that makes greater use of 
our own raw materials and minerals (RDP, 1994). 
SA’s endowment of mineral resources --- Exploitation of   minerals must optimize 
their developmental impact, especially job creation, across the economy. Mining must 
catalyze broader industrialization --- (The Polokwane Conference Economic 
Transformation resolution, 2012). 
Accordingly, the basic direction of SA's mineral policy extends significantly beyond the 
boundaries of mineral resources, since the policy instruments of SA are so intensely 
focused on the matters of economic growth and income redistribution. 
A detailed exposition of SA's mineral policy as an enabler of economic growth can be 
found in a government white paper, entitled: ‘A Minerals and Mining Policy for South 
Africa’, released by the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) in 1998. Six main 
themes emerge from the white paper: 
 Business Climate and Mineral Development, which looks at the continuation of 
policies conducive to investment, and includes a section on Mineral Rights and 
Prospecting Information which presents changes to the system of access to, and 
mobility of, mineral rights 
 Participation in Ownership and Management, which examines racial and other 
imbalances in the industry 
 People Issues, which looks at health and safety, housing needs, migrant labor, 
industrial relations and downscaling 
 Environmental Management 
 Regional co-operation 
 Governance  
These areas of focus indicate that many common endeavors have been undertaken. These 
include extensive surveys, holding both public mineral policy workshops as well as 
bilateral meetings between the government and investors. In addition, the Mineral Policy 
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Process Steering Committee comprises a wide range of representatives from both the 
executive and legislative branches in Government, as well as organized business and 
organized labor, which culminated in the introduction of the inclusive report for the 
realization of economic growth (DME, 1998). 
Another distinguishing feature of SA compared to other countries is the government’s 
incorporation of the policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)1, based upon 'The 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act', into 'The Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA)'. The provision is detailed in the section 100 (2) (a) 
of the MPRDA: 
To ensure the attainment of the Government’s objectives of redressing historical, social 
and economic inequalities as stated in the Constitution, the Minister must within six 
months from the date on which this Act takes effect develop a broad-based socio-
economic empowerment Charter that will set the framework, targets and time-table for 
effecting the entry of historically disadvantaged South Africans into the mining 
industry, and allow such South Africans to benefit from the exploitation of mining and 
mineral resources(DME, 2002). 
To facilitate the goals of the MPRDA – elevating the participation of HDSA (Historically 
Disadvantaged South Africans) in the mining and minerals industry – the Broad-Based 
Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry was 
published according to the legislation referred to above, and was later amended to address 
a number of shortcomings discovered in 2010 in the process of implementing various 
elements of the Charter. The institutional goals of economic growth and income 
distribution integrated into the Charter’s approach towards the mining industry are plainly 
confirmed in its objectives (DME: 2010):  
 To promote equitable access to the nation's mineral resources to all the people of SA 
 To substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for HDSA to enter the 
mining and minerals industry and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's 
                                           
1 BEE is a program launched by SA government to redress the economic inequalities derived from Apartheid by 
giving disadvantaged groups (Blacks, Coloureds, Indians, and Chinese who arrived before 1994) economic 




 To utilize and expand the existing skills base for the empowerment of HDSA and to 
serve the community 
 To promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of mine 
communities and major labor sending areas 
 To promote beneficiation of SA's mineral commodities 
 Promote sustainable development and growth of the mining industry 
4.1.3. Strategic framework 
We can summarize the framework being pursued by SA for promoting its mining policies in 
the following way, which can be extracted from two documents, ‘Ready to Govern’ (1992) 
and ‘The Polokwane Conference for Economic Transformation Resolution’ (2012): “Pursuing 
the maximization of policy effectiveness through integrating the mining industry with 
relevant sectors”. The specific aims of the integration of mining with other sectors was 
further outlined in 'The African Mining Vision', adopted by the African Union Heads of State 
in 2009 as a series of linked components (portrayed in figure 6), operating and functioning 
independently of each other but achieving their maximum operability through interaction and 
overlap (AU, 2011:103), as below (AU, 2009:5). 
 Down-stream linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing 
 Up-stream linkages into mining capital goods,  consumables  &  services 
industries 
 Side-stream linkages into infrastructure and skills & technology development 
 Mutually beneficial partnerships between the state, the private sector, civil society, 
local communities and other stakeholders 
 A comprehensive knowledge of its mineral endowment 
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Figure 6: Linkages in the minerals industry and the relationship between firms 
 
 Source: AU.2011.p103 
To SA, the significance of R&D as a backbone for upholding the other linkages is surely a 
crucial strategic factor which cannot be ignored as other countries have done, since SA 
envisions the enabling of sustainable economic development through utilizing mineral 
resources as a growth engine; a goal clearly articulated as "a knowledge-driven African 
mining sector that catalyzes & contributes to the broad-based growth & development of, and 
is fully integrated into, a single African market"(AU, 2009:5). Indeed, SA can glean a 
valuable lesson from the examples of two Asian countries: Japan’s success in producing 
substantial profits through nurturing technical skills despite a lack of abundant mineral 
resources, and China’s efforts to entice foreign companies possessing advanced technologies 
to facilitate technological transfer; namely, the awareness that sustainable economic growth 
comes not only from an abundance of natural resources but from excellent human resources 
driving innovative, marketable R&D activities. 
4.1.4. Challenges and analysis 
These three unquestionably positive factors in SA – the diverse and abundant mineral 
resources, the clear direction of their mineral resource policy, and a clear strategic framework 
– would, it seems, be the most effective instruments to achieve their goals if they were 
permitted to operate organically and without any obstacles. However, in the following 
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sections shall examine a number of factors presenting practical gaps between the idealistic 
political goals and the reality of South Africa’s REE environment. As a methodological 
approach to find an optimal model and to analyze the generic environment of SA's mineral 
resources policies, the SWOT (strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats) analysis 
approach can be applied to gain a balanced and multifaceted view of SA's characteristics in 
relation to its intention to use minerals to promote economic prosperity, and its negotiating 
position towards foreign countries seeking to exploit SA’s resources.  
To begin, it will be instructive to define the four components of the acronym instrumentally, 
and place them in the context of both the domestic situation of SA’s mineral industry and 
their position in the context of the resource diplomacy policies of China, Japan and Korea. 
The first part will focus on the strengths and weaknesses, followed by an exploration of the 
opportunities and threats. The broad approach is therefore summarized below:  
 Part 1: Analysis of Strengths and Weaknesses  
- Strengths: advantages inherent to SA's internal environment 
- Weaknesses: pitfalls and vulnerabilities within SA's internal environment. 
 Part 2: Analysis of Opportunities and Threats  
- Opportunities: advantageous factors within the external environment 
- Threats: potentially threatening elements within the external environment 
4.1.5. Strengths 
As described in the previous section, SA’s core strengths are firstly its abundant, high quality 
mineral resource deposits, and secondly its clear vision and optimistic principles. The first of 
these strengths has drawn intense interest, particularly in the past five years, from countries 
exploring the potential to accumulate resources both domestically and abroad. These 
countries have invested enormous sums of money to construct a stable supply chain of 
mineral resources, essential for sustaining a high-tech driven economy from a long-term 
perspective. The second of SA’s strengths embodies a nationalistic vision that materializes in 
concrete policies around the core concept that SA should make use of its own endowments 
through the mining industry as a means of fostering its national prosperity. This view, 
forcefully articulated, can become a road map to inspire continuous motivation for the 




Despite the formidable potential of the strengths of SA’s minerals situation, it has consistently 
struggled to realize its goals – a fact that can be attributed to vulnerable side stream linkages 
in its industrial developments, as portrayed in figure 6. These side stream linkages are in fact 
vital components of the strategic framework of SA, as they contain Infrastructure, R&D, and 
skills – factors that are in fact an integral cornerstone for reinforcing and unifying all the 
other linkages. The following statement, based upon an analysis of data collected from a 
number of relevant documents cited in table 19, illustrates some of the fundamental 
challenges facing SA, both in its infrastructure and in its R&D and skills situation: "An 
inadequately educated workforce, restrictive labor regulations, poor labor-employer relations 
and low levels of productivity relative to the cost of labor constitute some of the most 




Table 19: South Africa Mining industry and challenges 




 Inadequate power supply infrastructure 
- "The supply of PGMs is affected by the erratic power supply"---the 
prospect of cobalt production from PGM mines is hampered by the 
chronic electricity shortage in SA (Burgess, 2010:7)". 
- "Electricity shortages --- have hindered the mining operations and 
the development of beneficiation of PGMs--- (Burgess, 2010:12)".  
- "Shortages of critical infrastructure such as rail, water, ports and 
electricity supply have a material impact on sustaining current 
beneficiation initiatives and a major threat to future prospects of 
growth in mineral value addition (DME, 2011:5)". 
 
 Poor railway infrastructure 
- "The problem with exporting ore is inadequate railway capacity 
(Burgess, 2010:9)". 
- "The shortage of railways, highways and carrying capacity hampers 
exports. Transnet, the transportations parastatal, has been widely 
criticized for inefficiency (Burgess, 2010:12)".  
- "Infrastructure constraints ---SA has benefited from the 
commodities boom since 2002 for minerals depending on rail or 
energy-intensive process --- the main constraints have been 
transport(rail) and energy infrastructure capacity that have been 




 Frequent incidences of production loss from consecutive mining 
strikes due to a weakened social infrastructure 
- "500,000 ounces of PGM production were lost due to strike action. 
--- In the mining sector it is not just about individual mineworkers' 
wages, but that problem is exacerbated by the deprivation in 
surrounding communities. In these communities the low 'social 
wage' – by which we mean a basket of services citizens should have 
access to such as water, sanitation, housing, safety, transport, 
health, education and electricity – places great strain on 
mineworkers as they must meet these needs from their individual 
wages. This in turn gives impetus to higher wage demands (Sibiya, 
2012:5-6)". 
- "The mining industry continues to operate under severe pressure, 
and the problems were exacerbated by the events at the Lonmin 
platinum mine in Marikana in August 2012, when wild-cat strikes 
for higher pay turned violent and the South African Police Service 
opened fire on protesting miners (Wocke & Sing, 2013: 6)". 
 
 Concerns about the environmental infrastructure 
- "Acid mine water in the greater Johannesburg region could pollute 
major mining operations --- This is a growing issue that could 




- "Cumulative harm to off-mine populations resulting from ---
contaminated ground water sources, acidic mine drainage, and 
ground instability must be addressed before they lead to even more 






 Shrinking R&D base 
- "Mining companies functioned poorly, starved of investment in 
plant and machinery--- They also suffered from a general lack of 
R&D to keep mining and processing operations competitive (AU, 
2011:3) ". 
- "Low research output in mining (Leeuw, 2011:17) ". 
- "There is a widespread view that while both the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and MINTEK have some 
capacity, there has been a clear deterioration over time. There are 
no specialist mining research units at any of the universities in SA 
although attempts are now being made to establish a center for 
mining mechanization at the University of the Witwatersrand 
(Kaplan, 2011:20)." 
- "SA's limited exposure to break-through research and development 
programs thwarts the prospects of innovation in creating new 
products for beneficiation (DME, 2011:6)." 
Skill 
 Dwindling skills base 
- "Import-substitution based industrialization, domestic minerals 
were seldom processed locally and converted into industrial 
products (AU, 2011:3) ". 
- "Low capacity to develop and manufacture products based on 
research finding (Leeuw, 2011:17) ". 
- "---it would seem the quality of mining engineers and related skills 
has been in decline (Kaplan, 2011:18)". 
- Skills shortage is being exacerbated by aggressive recruiting on the 
part of competitor firms, especially in Australia--- In a recent 
survey, 50% of the 45 firms supplying goods and services to the 
PMSs sector surveyed regarded the shortage of engineering and 
technical skills in SA as---the main obstacle to future growth--- 
(Kaplan, 2011:19). 
Education 
 Weakening educational base 
- "Low number of doctorates per capita in South Africa compared to 
its international competitors (Leeuw, 2011:17) ". 
 
 "The University of the Witwatersrand---and the University of 
Pretoria has seen significant declines in their capacities. --- There are 
some indications that the number of firms offering training has 
declined ---. There is now perceived decline in the local 
competencies---due to large number of skilled professionals moving 
abroad (Kaplan, 2011:18-20)". 
 Source: Collected from documents, 'AU.2011.p3, Burgess.2010.p6-12, DME.2011.p5-6, 
Kaplan.2011.p18-20, Leeuw.2011.p17, Sibiya.2012.p5-6, SIMS.2012.25-25, and 
Wocke & Sing.2013.p6', by author 
６８ 
 
4.2. Resource Diplomacies: East Asia and Africa 
Several Asian countries such as China, Japan and Korea, began making overtures towards the 
African continent from the late 1950s, with a view to forming political allegiances with SA 
directly and indirectly, apart from some western nations that had been involved with 
colonialism. As an example, China recovered its seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by 
a vote of the UN member states due primarily to receiving support from a number of African 
nations on the basis of its diplomatic success with the Nixon US administration during the 
Maoist period between 1971 and 1972 (Pannell, 2008:708). In the same vein, the attempts of 
Korea to build up diplomatic relations with African nations began to compete with North 
Korea's efforts, which initially began in the 1960s – earlier than Korea. Although Korea in the 
1970s had only ten embassies in Africa, far less than the 23 embassies of North Korea (NK) 
due to their belated realization of the significance of Africa, various diplomatic strategies 
such as their promotion of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1973 which urged nations to refuse 
relations with countries that recognized NK, and a presidential visit to Nigeria, Gabon, 
Senegal, and Kenya in the early 1980s enabled Korea to take its place as a member of the UN 
along with NK in September 1991 through a similar strategy of securing formal recognition 
from African leaders (Kim, S. 2012:54-55). 
It is worth noting that Africa is an area of intense interest from Asian countries not only due 
to its abundant natural resources, but also as an enormous consumer market of Asian goods 
and commodities – an attractive proposition for these countries that need to expand their local 
sales and provide sustainable economic growth. 
Unlike European partners such as UK or France that have aggressively explored and already 
invested a great deal of money on businesses linked to mineral resources since the colonial 
period, the approaches of the three major Asian countries towards Africa is worth examining 
in some detail, firstly because African researchers have lately intensified their studies into the 
stance of Asian actors towards Africa, and secondly because we can hope to obtain an optimal, 
mutually beneficial model of the relationships between African-Asian trading partners by 
analyzing the following areas: 
 What approaches have these Asian countries taken towards Africa? 
 How much can these strategies meet the practical requirements of Africa? 
６９ 
 
 If they cannot suffice to meet Africa’s requirements, how should African countries 
respond to possible threats posed by Asian countries’ encroachments?  
In order to understand the relationship between Asia and Africa adequately, it will be useful 
to consider the direction of their approach particularly with regard to their ODA policies, 
regular forums, and a broad evaluation through an analytical framework, as a number of 
crucial similarities will emerge between these countries, particularly in relation to their ODA 
and forum policies. It will then be possible to consider the results of this analysis in the broad 
context of the opportunity / threat dichotomy which constitutes the first half of the SWOT 
analysis method, in order to generate a model of mutual cooperation. 
4.2.1. China 
4.2.1.1. The feature of approach and ODA 
China's approaches towards Africa have been implemented in a comprehensive manner, 
regardless of the particular field, through the provision of social, economic, cultural, and 
educational assistance based on the principle of soft power defined by Harvard Professor 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr in 1990 (CRSLC, 2008:3) as the ability to attract rather than coerce as a 
means of persuasion in order to expand its influence and power over Africa politically and 
economically. As a result, China is held in a position of high regard and credibility by the 
African nations with whom it has been involved for ODA. As a result of their comprehensive 
efforts, China became Africa's major trade partner, outpacing the US, which had hitherto 
maintained a preeminent position in Africa since 2009. A comparison of the trade volumes of 
China ($117billion) and US ($113billion) in Africa from this year shows that they have 
maintained their dominance. (Shinn, 2011:3). 
The reason that China was able to expand its position in Africa faster than any other country 
can be attributed to the fact that China's assistance policies have continuously provided 
service infrastructure into a diverse range of fields related to service infrastructure, 
construction of roads, railways, government office building, schools, water systems, dams, 
and power plants – in a broad and unconditional manner (Pannell, 2008:708). Unlike the 
Western donors who set political conditions upon Africa to improve factors such as 
democratization, proper governance, and human rights, China's policy based on the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of their partner nations has evidently played an 
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important role in enabling its diplomatic strategies to permeate into the political atmosphere 
and ground of Africa without resistance (IWATA, 2012:211). Furthermore, China's assistance 
in providing educational and cultural programs has also played a contributory role to nurture 
the relationship between Africa and China. As examples, a diverse range of educational 
opportunities such as vocational and technical education, Chinese learning programs, 
scholarships for a chance to study in China, and programs for elite students have been 
developed and provided by China to assist African development and to improve the 
production and quality of African human resources (Pannell, 2008:716). 
Aside from the success of China's political influence on Africa, the extent of its financial 
profitability can also be confirmed through data provided by Standard Chartered showing 
increasing trade volumes, as illustrated in graph 4, as a close correlation of its broad 




Graph 4: China-Africa trade volume (2000-2012) 
(Unit: US$10 million) 
 
 Source: PRC. 2013 p4 
Graph 4 shows that the trade volumes between China and Africa have increased significantly 
over the past 12 years; initially at a slower pace between 2000-2003, but then sharply from 
2003-2012, keeping an impartial balance of trade among the parties. However, if we consider 
those figures from the point of view of comparing the volume of imports and exports, a 
concern emerges regarding a trade imbalance, in that most of China's exports consist of 
commodities such as mechanical and electrical products – consisting of 45.9% of China's 
total commodity exports to Africa (PRC, 2013:4) – whereas China’s imports from Africa still 
comprise mainly fuels, ores and metals, which are driven by China’s strategic interest in 
securing access to natural resources (SC, 2011:4). In other words, the trend of increasing 
commodity exports could be an indicator that China's most significant challenge – job 
creation – is gradually being overcome as its economy develops, and allows for greater social 
and political stability (Pannell, 2008:711). On the contrary however, the dramatic trade deficit 
of Chinese goods could also be an indicator that the unemployment rate of Africa will only 
increase over time as raw materials flow out of the continent, and manufactured goods return. 
For African countries with the ambition of enabling a national development plan through 
leveraging their natural resources, such a trend must appear manifestly detrimental to their 
development plans. 
It is worth noting that China’s definition of ODA as a source of development assistance to 
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Africa is fundamentally different to that of the OECD as to it is reticent to use the terms ‘aid’ 
or ‘donor’ in its cooperation in order to stress the concept of South-South cooperation by 
implying that China’s assistance of other developing countries is on the basis of itself being a 
developing country; and has nominated for itself the position of self-appointed leader of non 
OECD-DAC partners (Lum et al., 2009:1) (IWATA, 2012:214). The possible motive for 
China to be a non OECD-DAC partner could be attributed to a reluctance of the Chinese 
administration to be recognized as a major aid donor because of a fear by the government that 
its citizens may object to lavish spending on economic projects abroad (Lum et al.,2009:1). 
Thus, it prefers to use the expression ‘South-South cooperation’ to the terms ‘aid’ or ‘donor’, 
which emphasize that their aid does not originate from free support as well as insisting that 
their support to Africa must be reciprocated (IWATA, 2012:214). In order to further distance 
themselves from giving the image of providing official governmental assistance, the 
management of China's ODA is handled by the Ministry of Commerce through the arm of 
Eximbank established in 1994 through concessional loans; unlike other major donors that 
commit their administration to a centralized aid agency affiliated with a foreign affairs 
ministry (Lum et al., 2009:5) (IWATA, 2012:215). 
4.2.1.2. The forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC)  
The role of the FOCAC to enhance the relationship between China and African countries has 
facilitated a deepening of the collaboration between both partners in a wide range of 
aforementioned fields, having undertaken five meetings since 2000. From a political aspect, 
one internationally startling consequence of the forum was the re-establishment by Senegal 
and Chad of their previously annulled diplomatic relations with China, at the cost of giving 
up their relationship with Taiwan before FOCAC 3 in 2006 (IWATA, 2012:216). An overview 
of the agendas under discussion in the framework of the FOCAC is illuminating as an 
overview of China’s strategic approach, from the economic and infrastructural aspect, 
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Although it is difficult to evaluate precisely whether FOCAC has the capacity to create 
substantive mutual benefits from a long-term perspective, China's policies based on the 
principle of "South-South cooperation" have unquestionably garnered it goodwill both 
domestically and from African countries. This is evident in the affirmative signals given to 
China for tackling the unemployment problem through the increase of exported commodities 
to Africa, as well as the fact that it has enabled several countries within Africa to develop 





An overview of the Chinese/African relationship was summarized by a report entitled 
‘Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier’, published by World Bank in 
2007, stating "China and India’s newfound interest in trade and investment with Africa 
presents a significant opportunity for growth and integration of the Sub-Saharan continent 
into the global economy”. Indeed, it is difficult to deny that China's reciprocal policies have 
contributed considerably to provide Africa with new opportunities for economic growth 
(Broadman, 2007:1). Despite such an affirmative evaluation of China's approach towards 
Africa, some have expressed concerns about the honesty of China's motives in several 
African countries, as evidenced in the following documents:  
 Trade imbalance detrimental to job creation 
- Dwindled job opportunities from 190,000 in 2000 to 140,000 in 2005 of SA's 
textile industry due to the overflowing of low-priced China's clothing (Jauch et 
al., 2006: 238). 
- The exported products to China  are  copper,  and  iron ore  products,--- 
Africa’s  imports are based  on  manufactured products. This trend benefits 
China to sell its manufactured goods and buy primary products with little added 
value (Cisse, 2012:3). 
- The destruction of local industries and manufacturers because of Chinese 
imported cheap goods (Pannell, 2008:713). 
- China's ambitions toward Africa. 
- China’s involvement in SA has nothing to do with charity --- it wants money, and 
wants raw materials (Gumede, 2012:1). 
- China is buying into ‘strategic’ sectors in the SA economy partially, such as 
platinum, rare metals, financial sector linked to driving SA’s economic 
development (Gumede, 2012:3). 
- The characteristic of Chinese investments, mimicking Africa’s colonial (past), 
which brought economic growth with little industrialization, broad-based 
development or new human development opportunities (Gumede, 2012:4). 
- The undermining of labor conditions 
- China's bad record for worker safety and labor practices (Shinn, 2011:6). 
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- Trade unions and civil society groups' complaints about Chinese companies' 
undermining of basic workplace rights and environmental standards (Gumede, 
2012:4). 
- The vulnerability of Africa. 
- The absence of open international tenders to compare the quality and cost of 
China (Lagerkvist et al., 2011:34). 
 
4.2.2. Japan  
4.2.2.1. The feature of approach and ODA 
The overall trend of Japan’s ODA policies in the past few decades is a good indicator of the 
progression of Japan's interest in Africa. According to a paper by SATO in 2010, the period 
from 1954 till the present can be differentiated into five stages, according to the variable 
direction of its ODA, affected by the international environment and its domestic policies 
(SATO, 2010:85) (Wild et al., 2011:15-16); as follows: 
 1954-1972: Negligible ODA attention (Concentration on Asia). 
 1974-1980: Beginnings of an increase in ODA (Interest in Africa's resources affected 
by the First Oil Crisis). 
 1981-1988: Expansion of ODA (Due to pressure from the international community) 
 1989-2000: Prime donor, varying from 15-19 percent to 10 percent of ODA (Political 
Commitment and Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces).  
 2001-present: Reduction of ODA (Changing Aid Policy) 
The characteristics of Japan's ODA through this period have in fact been so unclear that it is 
fair to state by the late 1980s that "traditionally, the Japanese government does not have any 
particular African policy" (IWATA, 2012:218). A number of reasons have contributed to 
Japan’s passive and lackluster ODA response to Africa: its leading actors have been burdened 
with bureaucracy and weak interests in Africa, its involvement has been reactive and based 
on requirements from the US, its increased ODA to Africa in the 1980s was in order to avoid 
a trade conflict with the US, and the fact that Japan’s real interest in Africa is diplomatic 
rather than economic in all areas except Africa’s natural resources, with a goal of becoming a 
permanent member of the UNSC(SATO, 2010:67) (IWATA, 2012:218-219). 
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With 53 UN votes across all African countries, the political power of Africa is still of a 
sufficient magnitude that Japan could not afford to disregard its importance, particularly 
given that it had failed in a bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC in April 2005. 
Just two months before, at the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, Japan pledged to boost its 
Japanese aid to $10 billion by 2009 – undoubtedly this was influenced by its ambitions 
towards the UN (SATO, 2010:67). Due to the political advantages of its African interventions, 
Japan’s pledges have been upheld despite their failure to produce outcomes as substantial or 
comprehensive as the Chinese government’s results. Nevertheless, we have witnessed a 
change in Japanese business due to the changing global economic situation and declining 
Western markets with their economic crisis; and African countries have made significant in-
roads to sustainable economic development in the 21st century, along with a broad agenda 
around Africa’s environments, discussed in the framework of the TICAD since 1993. These 
facts together imply that there is a reasonable possibility for Japan to take a more active 
interventionist role in Africa's affairs in the near future (IWATA, 2012:218-219). 
4.2.2.2. The Tokyo International Conference for Africa's Development (TICAD)  
TICAD, established in 1993 as the main Japanese platform for Africa's development, has a 
history that predates FOCAC, and can even lay claim to being the prototype for FOCAC. 
Moreover, the contents and agenda of TICAD’s discussions around African development 
have also been much more inclusive than those of FOCAC and have even served as a model 
for FOCAC over the duration of its five meetings from 1993 to 2013, as summarized in table 




Table 21: Summary of major discussed contents of TICAD (1993-2013) 
TICAD(I-V) Major Discussed Contents 
TICAD I 
(1993, Tokyo) 
 Strengthening political and economic reforms 
 Emphasizing of the of private sector for sustainable development 
 Reaffirming ultimate regional integration and cooperation goals 
 Relieving of emergency from natural and man-made disaster to constrain development 
 Transferring of Asian development experience to Africa 
TICAD II 
(1999, Tokyo) 
 Social development and poverty reduction: promoting Human Development 
- Economic development: promoting the private sector 




 Reviewing the achievements of TICAD process and discussing future direction 
 Achievements of the TICAD process 
- Raising Awareness of the Challenges Facing Africa 
- Advocating that "ownership" by African countries of their development process and" 
partnership "by the international community in support 
- Expansion of Development Partnership: underscoring of South-South cooperation 
especially Asia-Africa cooperation 
 A compass for the future of the TICAD process 
- Leadership and people's participation in the African development process 
- Peace and good governance\ 
- Human security 
- Respect for distinctiveness, diversity, and identity 
 A new partnership: mutual respect and trust 
TICAD IV 
(2009, Yokohama) 
 Boosting economic growth 
 Ensuring human security 
 Addressing environmental issues and climate change 
 Broadening partnership 
TICAD V 
(2013, Yokohama) 
 Boosting economic growth 
 Accelerating infrastructure and capacity development 
 Empowering farmers as mainstream economic actors 
 Promoting sustainable and resilient growth 
 Creating an inclusive society for growth 
 Consolidating peace, stability, democracy, and good governance 
Source: Collected from the 'Past TICAD Archive (http://www.ticad.net)' by author 
In spite of such a long relative history compared to China, the unvarying nature of the 
subjects under discussion provides some justification for questioning the sincerity of Japan’s 
forums around the African continent. For this reason, one tends to encounter more negative 
assessments of Japan’s attitudes in Africa than positive, which indicates that the fundamental 
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direction of Japan’s policies have been so ambiguous, indifferent and ineffectual that it is 
easy to argue that their motive is political rather than economic, and self-directed rather than 
genuinely concerned about Africa’s best interests. 
4.2.2.3. Evaluation 
Reviewing the above facts, it becomes apparent that Japan’s sincerity in its declarations at 
TICAD can be questioned, and it lacks originality as a genuine partner of Africa. The specific 
wording choices used in TICAD III, such as "ownership" and "partnership”, also appear in 
the OECD-DAC, which suggests that Japan might have borrowed its principles and 
expressions from the OECD-DAC in which it acts as a member (IWATA, 2012:218-220). 
Furthermore, a number of voices have pointed out that there has been a lack of tangible 
outcomes in the Japanese system over the past 20 years, due to the lack of concrete actionable 
programs and an overabundance of empty rhetoric signaling a practical indifference. If Japan 
hopes to become a significant contributor to Africa, there is an urgent need for them to clarify 
their policies and attitudes, and to provide tangible proofs of their authenticity and 
responsibility (Aoki, 2013:4).  
4.2.3. Korea 
4.2.3.1. The feature of approach and ODA 
The goals of Korea towards Africa are broadly quite similar to those of China and Japan 
described in the foregoing sections: securing natural resources, expanding their political 
influence, and establishing economic cooperation. With the exception of Japan’s singular 
political motive to be accepted as a permanent member of the UNSC through African 
participation, over time the resources procurement and the building of economic cooperation 
have emerged as the dominant common themes of Asian countries in Africa. However, 
compared to China and Japan who have been entrenched in Africa for many decades, Korea 
suffers from a lack of sufficient experience and accumulated knowledge that has hampered its 
ability to accomplish its two aims. A clear example of Korea’s relative immaturity in handling 
African affairs was provided earlier, in its miscalculation of the feasibility and profitability of 
securing overseas resources. With respect to building a cooperative relationship for economic 
development, it is an unfortunate fact that Korea’s strategies, which have emphasized either 
sharing or transferring manufacturing experience with developing countries, have not been 
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able to demonstrate successful outcomes – which indicates that Korea’s approach towards 
Africa is still under constant modification (GLRC, 2011:233-234). In order to understand 
Korea's awkwardness in dealing with African affairs, it will be useful to review their short 
history with Africa. 
Initiated in the 1960s by a political motivation to compete with NK, Korea’s relationship with 
Africa entered into a stable period since the middle of the 2000s, from which the Korea-
African Forum (KAF) has held regular meetings every three years until the present; passing 
through several stages shown below (Kim, 2012:55): 
 1960s - 1991: Seeking to form cooperative relationships with Africa to compete with 
NK 
 1991 - 2006: Stagnation stage after gaining entry to the UN in 1991 
 2006 - present: Seeking to build new cooperative relationships related to resource 
diplomacy and African development  
Korea's effort to establish a new cooperative relationship was manifested in the "Korea 
Initiative for Africa's Development (KIAD)”, released by the Roh Moo-hyun administration 
in 2006 as a backbone of the institutional apparatus constituted of the following factors (Kim, 
2012:55-56): 
 Increasing volume of ODA by three times by 2008.  
 Sharing of development experience through inviting 1,000 African officials for 
capacity building by 2009, dispatching of Korean experts and volunteers, and 
assisting African governments to devise national development plans by means of 
holding workshops. 
 Setting up Korea-Africa Forum to establish 'The Korea Africa Economic 
Cooperation Forum (KIAD)' as a committee divided into following three parts: 
business, government, and academia. 
 Promoting Africa's ownership for furthering its social and economic development 
The total ODA increased rapidly between 2006 and 2010 from by an average of 29 per cent 
each year as portrayed in graph 5. This increase also shows that the outcomes of KIAD began 
to become manifest not long after the announcement of Roh's administration (Kim, 2012:57). 
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Graph 5: The ODA volume of Korea related to Africa (1987-2010) 
 
    Source: Kim, S. 2012. p57 
Korea's basic direction with respect to ODA, at least in the rhetoric used to define it, appears 
barely distinguishable from the discourse of South-South cooperation utilized by China, as 
they similarly highlight the significance of sharing development experience with developing 
countries, particularly as the first member of OECD-DAC to overcome the status of aid 
recipient of OECD-DAD in 2010; and shows their confidence that this model is an effective 
one to help developing countries through promoting technical cooperation and human 
resources development (GLRC, 2011:233-234).  
4.2.3.2. The Korea-African Forum (KAF)  
Similarly to the cases of China and Japan, the debates over determining the agenda for the 
framework of the KAF are closely related to the direction of ODA, and in a sense serve as a 
demonstration of Korea’s ODA policy, as outlined in table 22. For instance, each of the items 
of discussion in the agenda for the first meeting is connected with the basic direction of 




Table 22: Summary of major agenda of KAF (2006-2012) 




- Potentiality of Africa & Seeking of economic cooperation 
- Sharing of Korea's development experience with Africa 




- Reducing tension and building trust on the African continent & the Korean Peninsula 
- Strengthening inter-governmental cooperation to enhance a beneficial partnership 
- Korea's commitment to double its ODA flow to Africa by 2012 compared to 2008 
- Focusing on sharing development experiences & knowledge to develop human resources 
- Promoting the exchange of information and experiences in order to achieve the MDGs 
- Promoting trade and investment between Korea and Africa 
- Fostering increased cooperation in fields such as railways, ports, roads, electricity, etc. 




- Strengthening cooperation at the African continental level by engaging the AU to contribute to the 
development and integration of Africa 
- Continuing to support the fight against poverty and efforts for sustainable development to achieve 
MDGs  
- Recognizing that Korea's development experience may be of great value in Africa’s development 
- Efforts to share Korea’s experience and knowledge for developing human resources 
- Korean Government’s expansion of duty-free and quota-free items for the 48 least developed countries 
- Promoting investments and sustainable development through an Public-Private Partnership 
- Emphasizing the development of small and medium scale enterprises for economies and employment  
Source: Collected and modified from the homepage (http://forum.mofa.go.kr) by author 
While Korea’s history with Africa is relatively short, the scope of their agenda, which has 
broadened significantly since the forum’s inception, has become as inclusive as the agendas 
of China and Japan. While all the Asian nations share similarities in their agendas, the 
distinctive, consistent characteristic that differentiates Korea from its neighboring countries is 
its emphasis on the significance of sharing its own development experience according to the 
basic direction of its ODA. 
4.2.3.3. Evaluation 
One indicator that Korea’s ODA is still not sufficiently matured is the past criticism by a 
number of scholars, who implied that in reality Roh Moo-hyun’s KIAD pays little more than 
lip service in its commitment to Africa’s development (SAIS, 2010:94)(IWATA, 2012:221). 
Another line of argument has suggested that, on the one hand, Korea remains at a nascent 
level in its understanding of Africa, having exhibited a profound lack of knowledge about the 
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continent; and has emphasized the need for Korea’s principles of inclusive growth to be acted 
upon in tangible, material ways and not just as empty sloganeering (Kim, Y,2012:2). 
If we review these three Asian countries' approaches towards Africa, we can draw some broad 
implications about their commonalities and differences, and understanding the ways they 
have used the mechanisms of ODA and their respective forums, through the opportunity and 
threat components in the SWOT matrix. 
 
4.2.4. Opportunity 
Despite a marked absence of noteworthy outcomes, the diverse and comprehensive pledges 
made by the three Asian nations appear to be sufficiently attractive to have drawn the keen 
attention of African countries envisioning sustainable growth. Indeed, the overtures made by 
these Asian countries must be seen as favorable by Africa, as they offer a way to raise the 
profile and status of African countries to advanced nations. For instance, in the evaluation of 
China we saw that the pledges offered to Africa represent a considerable opportunity for 
economic growth. 
4.2.5. Threat 
Notwithstanding the advantageous elements of Asia’s movements towards Africa, a number 
of threatening elements are also present, and have become increasingly manifest over time. In 
the case of China, the problem of the trade imbalance is growing into a daunting matter that 
has exacerbated the very serious unemployment problem in Africa. China’s desire to occupy 
strategic sectors will impede Africa's development in the long-term, and there is some 
statistical evidence that the erosion of African jobs has already resulted from this relationship. 
Moreover, the approaches of Japan and Korea have both suffered from an insincere and 
noncommittal perception that casts doubt on their authenticity. Thus, while we have seen that 
the partnership between the Asian countries and Africa is becoming enhanced and reinforced 
in quite a comprehensive manner, the selfishness of the underlying motives and the perceived 
superficiality may hinder real progress if not addressed. At this point the SWOT Matrix has 
been completed on the basis of the four analyzed components, from SA as the internal 
environment and Africa as the external environment, as illustrated in figure 7.  
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- Diverse, comprehensive, and 
favorable pledges related to 
financial assistance, 
infrastructure, human resources 
development and so forth 
Threat 
- Trade imbalance detrimental 
to job creation 
- Satellization of strategic 
sectors crucial for economic 
development 
- Hollow promises that are 




- Abundant Natural 
Resources 
- Clear Policy vision with 
mineral resources for 
national development 





- New design of ambitious and 
customized model based on 





- Development of cooperative 
system to create mutual 
benefits in a substantial way 




infrastructure of power, 
transportation, society, 
and environment 
- Shrinking R&D 
environment, dwindling 





- Enhancing of sectoral 
infrastructure by joining a 
partner that provides better 
contract term 
- Promoting of R&D, skill, and 
education infrastructure by 
joining a partner that has 
comparative advantage  
WT 
(Developing alternatives to 
avoid worst case scenario) 
- Protecting vulnerable 
infrastructure, sectors from 
external risk factors by 
analyzing  feasibility and 
profitability 
- Promoting downstream 
industry connected with 
R&D, skill, and education 
appropriate for sustainable 
job creation 
    Source: Analyzed by author 
It will now be appropriate given this important context, to reiterate the central issue raised in 
the introduction, namely, the question of how African countries should respond to the 
pressures and opportunities of Asian interest in their mineral deposits.  
4.3. Resource Diplomacies: East Asia and South Africa 
While the African viewpoint was used to analyze the external environmental factors, since the 
Asian countries have not limited the scope of their focus to SA, it is still suitable to narrow 
the focus of the investigation of the internal environmental elements to SA alone, as its 
regulatory and political environment is the most complex and mature in Africa, and 
influences the entire continent. 
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Before we can broach a possible answer to the question, it is worth querying just how much 
capacity the SA government really has to control its mineral industrial policy effectively in a 
similar manner to China’s enhancement of state control of its mineral sector both 
domestically through consolidation policies, and internationally through restriction policies 
on exports for economic development; as reviewed in chapter 2. However, the direction of 
SA’s mineral policies is markedly divergent from China’s, in that SA adopted a principle of 
“choosing and concentrating” instead of selecting a single dominant controlling policy 
system through nationalization – which has recently been demanded by voices in SA such as 
the ANC Youth League, the Trade Union Federation (COSATU), and the Communist Party 
(SACP), who have preferred the development model undertaken by China (Burgess, 2010:14) 
(Mail & Guardian, 2012). This was confirmed by a speech given by Enoch Godongwana, 
who stated that "The state will increase state ownership, but only in sectors where it is 
deemed appropriate"; and furthermore, "any nationalization in the mineral sector would be on 
beneficiation and identified natural resources including shale and other natural gases, iron ore 
and coal", at the ANC's elective conference held in Manguang in 2012 (Mail & Guardian, 
2012). It appears, to judge by this rhetoric, that SA’s top priority will be placed on sustainable 
job creation to meet the requirements of the basic direction of the mineral policy, as the 
beneficiation sector is directly linked to the downstream industry. The Amended MPRD Bill 
of 2013 clarified this through incorporating a definition of beneficiation (MMR, 2013:41) 
Nevertheless, as illustrated in table 19, the critically vulnerable South African elements such 
as infrastructure, R&D, and skills, which belong to side stream linkages as shown in figure 6, 
raise doubts about the viability of the policy direction announced in Manguang to produce 
substantial outcomes despite a weakening of the side stream linkages.  
The current direction of SA’s policies, which have only focused on beneficiation and 
identified natural resources, may indicate that it is not capable of taking an aggressive 
interventionist role in the matters of the restriction of mineral extraction amounts in 
comparison with China’s REE policy. A sentence in a WTO working paper released in 2010 
(WTO, 2010:25) indicated that SA has established no general trade policies for strategic 
minerals for both exporting and importing nations, with the exception of China. This 
indicates that SA’s mineral policies have a number of critical gaps that inhibit its ability to 
develop adequate diplomatic responses which can facilitate undistorted trade situations in 
REEs between importer and exporter nations, apart from its current legislations and 
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provisions to regulate trading volumes, such as a tariff system.  
For that reason, it is of crucial importance for SA's policymakers to balance the existing 
policies across the domestic and international dimensions to reach its policy goals of effective 
national development, by developing policy instruments through analyzing the diplomatic 
strategies employed by foreign countries such as China, Japan, and Korea as a way of 
managing its mineral resources. 
The following set of data contains a tantalizing prospect as an answer to the question of 
which direction SA's policy instruments should be developed in order to create cooperative 
mineral trading relationships. Table 23 and graph 6 illustrate the figures of trade volumes 
between SA and Asian countries as well as the items that have primarily been traded between 
the partners. 
Table 23: Trading trends between Korea and South Africa (2007-2012) 
(Unit: US$ million) 
Classification 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012.1-4 
Export 
(From Korea to SA) 1,752 1,397 1,082 1,668 2,255 821 
Import 
(From SA to Korea) 1,766 2,159 1,171 2,272 3,105 935 
 
      Source: MOFA.2013. The Embassy of the Republic Korea to the Republic of South Africa 
Graph 6: Trade & Investment between Japan and South Africa (2003-2012) 
 
     Source: Japanese prospectus.2014.p9 
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The increasing trade volumes over this period indicate that the economic value of SA towards 
Asia has been reinforced through its position as not only a consumer market to buy 
commodities such as original equipment components, automobiles, heavy construction 
equipment, cell phones and goods transport vehicles, but as a crucial provider of mineral 
resources such as platinum, iron ore, ferro-alloys, copper and aluminum to Asian countries 
(Japanese prospectus, 2014:9) (MOFA, 2013). 
As graph 4 demonstrates however, a similar trend towards a trade imbalance in the trading 
relationships can be detected between SA and the two Asian countries similar to the situation 
between China and Africa, which implies that the result of trading could be detrimental to SA 
from a long-term perspective in that imported commodities from Asian countries could 
encroach upon SA's labor market, contrary to the direction of its mineral policy.  
Nevertheless, the fact that SA is becoming increasingly an arena of competition among 
countries needing mineral resources provides an opportunity for SA to develop effective 
policy instruments by leveraging its worth as a resource rich country, as explained below. 
The burden on Africa to consider producing an optimal model has been increasing – as seen 
in a suggestion proposed by Watanabe/Hanatani in TICAD IV that African governments 
establish and implement country-specific industrial development strategies for prospective 
growth industries, and to opportunistically take advantage of current favorable gestures from 
the external environment (Watanabe, 2008:16). This process of establishing an optimal model 
to create mutual benefits provides an invaluable opportunity for African nations to see the 
rather insubstantial rhetoric of their policies and official declarations gradually become 
realized and produce practical outcomes that can be modified and refined over time. 
Moreover, given SA's position as the leading African mining country with the 5th largest 
mining industry in the world, it is ideally suited to serve as a representative of the African 
continent, and its position should not be underestimated as the policies and directions 
initiated in SA will create ripple effects that could encourage other African countries to form 
their own rational industrial policies to benefit their economic development over the long 
term.  
Three keywords in particular – competitiveness, comparison, and choice – embedded in the 
framework of the SWOT Matrix are essential components in creating an optimal model, as 
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they are integral to the business fields in which economic units are engaged in the most 
effective production outcomes. It is apparent that if we view the aspect of competitiveness in 
relation to Asian countries’ fierce rivalry with Africa, there is a lack of comparison and choice. 
The lack of comparison and choice in the African environment implies that African policies 
have not been sufficiently aggressive to counter the threat posed by Asian countries and 
products effectively. It would be worthwhile therefore to pose the question, “What key 
defining terms should SA employ in its endeavors to design a new model”?  In order for 
those terms to be employed properly, SA should have a view to developing ambitious and 
customized models to meet its real business and political conditions, instead of attempting to 
design a standardized mechanism, in order to respond with flexibility and address the 
elements within the external environments adequately and with a view to its comparative 
advantages. An aggressive and open stance with respect to supplying mineral resources will 
be more effective than a closed, restrictive, and controlling approach, because its plentiful 
natural resources should be utilized as an inducement to attract the attention of partners. 
Partners who desire to trade with SA for its mineral resources will be willing to provide much 
better incentives for trade than other resource rich countries. Accordingly, SA should consider 
ways in which it can nurture a favorable investment environment to foreign partners through 
mechanisms such as tax benefits and deregulation while at the same time maximizing its own 
profits. Models based on the key principles of comparison and choice, which can be arrived 
at after comparing the approaches of Asian countries in the following portions, could meet 
the requirements of WO. 
Firstly, SA must take the initiative to suggest specific terms of tender around the expansion of 
social and industrial infrastructure, as well as preferential conditions linked to the supplying 
of natural resources to countries desiring to participate in a tender. Through this method, SA 
could induce countries with either development experiences or a notion of South-South 
cooperation to participate in infrastructural development projects that could produce 
substantial outcomes. 
Secondly, in order to reinforce its weakened R&D, skills, and educational conditions, SA 
could also suggest terms of contract which contained specific action plans such as the 
conducting of joint research projects, the initiation of researcher or student exchange 
programs, and the sharing of educational training programs on the condition that they can 
８９ 
 
provide additional incentives according to the performance of the research conducted – aside 
from other existing preferential conditions. The view of these partnerships should be to not 
only produce improved research outcomes, but also to promote the research skills of its 
academics, and thereby to boost the capacity of SA’s domestic minerals industry by 
inculcating the skills of countries with more advanced technologies in the area of mineral 
resources such as Japan and China.  
Thirdly, although the WO analysis did not specifically highlight the problematic issue of the 
promotion of downstream industries, this matter is directly connected to the requirement of 
job creation that was promoted at Manguang in 2012 as being the single highest priority of 
SA’s mineral policy. Thus, the revitalization of SA’s manufacturing industries through the use 
of its abundant mineral resources and the technological advancement of its beneficiation 
processes must be a significant item on the roadmap of sustainable economic growth for SA. 
To enable inclusive economic growth through creating job opportunities, SA must forge these 
mutually beneficial joint ventures with foreign companies related to the steel, vehicle, and 
materials industry, and advance their mining technologies to bring them up to date with Asian 
countries. For that reason, Korea or Japan, which both have significant development 
experience through their own steel, car, and electronic industries, would appear to be the most 
appropriate partner for SA, since SA can obtain a practical transfer of the techniques needed 
to strengthen the competitiveness of their domestic industry and enable job creation over the 
long term.  
Solutions to the matrix of ST and WT can be envisaged by examining the answers found in 
SO and WO – seeking substantial outcomes based on market principles. From the SWOT 
Matrix above, it is apparent that while we cannot say with definitiveness that these proposed 
models would produce the most optimal bilateral benefits, nevertheless the elements of 
comparison and choice are fundamental to facilitate the trade in mineral resources between 
importers and exporters and must be integrated into any model adopted by Africa in its 
foreign relations. It is incumbent on Africa that it views itself as more than simply a recipient 
of the unlimited financial, infrastructural, and educational support from countries with their 
own political and economic motivation. Rather, Africa must demonstrate a willingness to 
sovereignly address its internal and external environmental challenges by adding comparison 
and choice to enable competitiveness, and learn to develop its own strengths to produce 
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sustainable development and growth by promoting foreign investments and partnerships 






REEs have increasingly become a fundamental component of technologies across a vast 
spectrum of industrial mechanisms, to the extent that they are becoming a key factor to 
influence the policies of developed countries.   
While we have not yet witnessed the appearance of RN, we have begun to see 
counterstrategies by nations concerned about their ability to secure a stable supply chain, as a 
response to the monopolistic attempts of China towards particular minerals, manifested in the 
shape of regulatory, protectionist, and restrictive mineral policies.  
The policy directions of resource-rich countries have focused around the enhancement of 
mining production, domestic R&D ability, and international efforts to forge beneficial 
relationships between trading partners on the principle of free trade, as witnessed in the case 
of the WTO. In contrast, resource-poor countries have adopted a spectrum of efforts such as 
seeking to diversify their supply lines, the fostering of their recycling industry, the 
enhancement of research abilities, and the building of flexible stockpiling systems to smooth 
the procurement of mineral resources. Through lessons gleaned from these endeavors, 
countries with a lack of domestic mineral resources such as Korea have gained valuable 
expertise in coping with the inherent turbulence caused by resource-dependency.  
Although it is undoubtedly reasonable for countries to prepare a diversity of countermeasures 
against the possibility of supply shortages of mineral resources, the paramount matter is to 
build sound relationships to facilitate mutual benefits, since some countries have determined 
not to adhere to the WTO’s exhortation of free trade between traders. In a real sense, the 
proportion of undesirable relationships appears more dominant than healthy ones, as 
confirmed previously in chapters 2 and 3. 
The initiative to build these relationships does not necessarily depend on the quantity of 
domestic mineral resources, as evidenced by the fact that China’s overseas mineral policies 
are very aggressive, whereas African countries have proven reticent to take diplomatic 
initiative towards the three competing Asian countries. 
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For that reason, a cooperative model cannot be made without mutual efforts and harmony 
between partners in ways that transcend superficial imbalances of power. As we observed, 
these disparities would certainly never disappear entirely due to the ways in which they 
threaten the mutual benefit of relationships if competiveness, comparison, and choice do not 
operate in harmony. Due to the tension between these essential elements particularly around 
the factors of comparison and choice, the policy instruments of Africa have failed to produce 
a convincing cooperative model. 
The reform of SA’s policy instruments should be extended beyond a limited spectrum of 
fields in order to address and cover the educational, infrastructural and R&D agendas 
comprehensively and integrally for each cooperative model; thoroughly fulfilling the 
conditions of the SWOT Matrix and inspiring sincerity towards potential bidders. If South 
Africa strengthened its own policy instruments by developing a cooperative model operating 
organically on the attributes of competitiveness, comparison, and choice, and was willing to 
stand as a representative of Africa, it could have the capacity to become a formidable trading 
partner to facilitate equitable mineral and REE policies between Asian countries such as 
Korea and Africa, and to provide an example to the rest of Africa of the potential to create 
win-win situations and foster economic growth through the prudent management of mineral 
resource endowments. 
Beyond question, the resultant cooperative model based on the principles outlined above, 
would contribute to facilitating mineral trading between importers and exporters and to 
maximizing the domestic benefits to SA. A mineral market controlled by sound trading 
principles would be a far more attractive prospect to draw partner investors to the country, 
enabling long-term growth of trading volumes in mineral resources compared to the currently 
compromised situation caused by distorted policies. Figure 7 described the ways in which SA 
can bolster its weaknesses for beneficiation, resulting in sustainable job creation. Moreover, 
SA’s trading partners would also enjoy synergistic benefits, as they would not only enable 
economic growth in SA according to the goals encapsulated in the Opportunity quadrant of 
the SWOT Matrix, but also secure for themselves a stable supply chain of needed mineral 
resources.  
In conclusion, it is evident that, given the increasing importance of REEs, and the global 
tensions around their acquisition and stockpiling, it is crucial to develop policies that 
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emphasize mutual beneficiation and cooperation between trading partners, in order to enable 
resource rich countries to foster economic growth, and to enable resource poor countries to 
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The name of project Designated Organization Year 
Development of Hot-dipped Aluminum Alloy Coated Steels Toru Tsuru Tokyo Institute of Technology 
2007 




The new function which hydrogen induces in subnano lattice substance Masuo Okada Tohoku University 
Self-forming Nano-particle Catalyst without Precious Metals Yasuo Nishihata Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
Development of Barium-based New Lead-free 
Piezoelectric Materials with Ultrahigh 
Piezoelectric Property for Piezoelctric Frontier 
Satoshi Wada 
University of Yamanashi 
Development of IiO2-based Transparent Electrode 
Tethuya Hasegawa 
Kanagawa Academy of Science 
and Technology 
High Performance Anisotropic Nano composite Permanent Magnets with Low 
Rare Earth Content 
Satoshi Hirosawa 
Hitachi Metals 
Material Design and Processing of Highly-Dispersed Catalyst with Minimum 








Development of Innovative Energy Conversion Systems with Molecular 
Catalysts Replacing Precious Metals 
Yoshinori Naruta 
Kyushu University 
Ubiquitous Element Strategy for Function Emergence Hideo Hosono Tokyo Institute of Technology 
Functional design by precise synthesis of silicon oxide compounds Kazuyuki Kuroda Waseda University 
Design and Processing of Functional Materials with Multi-elements Based on 




Organic Molecular Approach to High-performance secondary Batteries and 
Mechanistic Elucidation of Charge-discharge Processes 
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Development of the plantinoid-elements free functional magnetic material by 
compound interface control 
Eiji Kita 
University of Tsukuba 
Development of Eco-friendly Post Lithium-ion Batteries Shigeto Okada Kyushu University 
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